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I
INTRODUCTION
The 1988 Term of the Supreme Court marked a watershed
event in the development of civil rights law,' particularly as it ap-
plies to employment discrimination. 2 In a series of cases that asser-
tively introduced the new jurisprudence of the Rehnquist-Scalia era,
the Supreme Court decisively recast the burdens of proof upon civil
rights plaintiffs;3 the scope of statutory protections against racial
harassment;4 the procedural hurdles to the vindication of civil rights
claims; 5 and most notably, the permissible limits of local govern-
mental efforts to benefit minority opportunity.
6
These developments brought to a close the emergence of a
doctrine that sought to balance the claims of civil rights plaintiffs for
equality and desegregation against the claims of those dispreferred
individuals who would not benefit under remedial schemes and who
would, to some extent, be forced to bear the cost for redressing past
discrimination. 7 In place of the balance that characterized the
Supreme Court's difficult and divided holdings in the affirmative ac-
tion cases of the past decade, the Rehnquist-Scalia wing of the Court
recast remedial race-conscious programs into the mold of increas-
I As Julius Chambers, the Director-Counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense and
Education Fund, cogently expressed, "This was one of the worst terms of Court that we
have experienced in our lifetime and it has been and will be devastating to victims of
employment discrimination." Julius L. Chambers, Twenty-Five Years of the Civil Rights Act:
History and Promise, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 159, 173 (1990).
2 In the words of the defeated Civil Rights Act of 1990, "Congress finds that ... in
a series of recent decisions addressing employment discrimination claims under Federal
law, the Supreme Court cut back dramatically on the scope and effectiveness of civil
rights protections .. " H.R. 4000, S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a)(1) (1990). See
Charles S. Ralston, Court v. Congress: Judicial Interpretation of the Civil Rights Acts and Con-
gressional Response, 8 YALE L. & PoL'y REV. 205, 205 (1990) (attributing civil rights
reverses to seven decisions handed down over an eight-week period in the summer of
1989). Despite the defeat of the 1990 Act, the same need "to provide additional protec-
tions against unlawful discrimination in employment" was echoed in the 1991 Act. Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2(3) (1991).
3 See Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); see generally Kenni F.
Judd, Burdens of Proof Under Title VII in the 90s: Wards Cove vs. the Civil Rights Act of 1990,
15 NovA L. REV. 67 (1991).
4 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989);Jett v. Dallas Indep.
Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 201 (1989).
5 See Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
6 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 490 U.S. 469 (1989).
7 See Richard H. Fallon & Paul C. Weiler, Firefighters v. Stotts: Conflicting Models of
Racial Justice, 1984 Sue. CT. REV. 1, 58; see also Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267, 283 (1986) (citing Fallon & Weiler for this proposition); Joel L. Selig, Affirmative
Action in Employment: The Legacy of a Supreme Court Majority, 63 IND. LJ. 301, 306 (1988)
(referring to this doctrinal balance as the Brennan-Powell legacy).
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ingly impermissible quotas and rejected the claims of groups that
had been victims of past discrimination.8
The Supreme Court's turnaround on civil rights has provoked
the greatest disjuncture between contemporary practices and doctri-
nal law since Brown v. Board of Education.9 Innumerable everyday
practices designed to advance minorities and women in the work-
force are now subject to challenge on the grounds of claimed re-
verse discrimination or impermissible use of racial or gender
classifications. 10 The disjuncture came to an early head with the ve-
toed Civil Rights Act of 1990,11 and the ultimately successful Civil
8 See, e.g.,Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 658 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
9 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For discussions of "massive resistance" to desegregation,
seeJ. HARvIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE 61-127 (1978); Charles L. Black,
The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. REV. 3, 22 (1970).
10 Affirmative steps to integrate the workforce have increasingly become the norm
in institutional employment, both public and private. Measures range from directed re-
cruitment programs such as IBM's collaboration with local Urban League chapters in
order to specially tailor minority recruitment efforts, see HUDSON INSTITUTE, OPPORTU-
NrTY 2000: CREATIVE AFFIRMATIvE ACTION STRATEGIES FOR A CHANGING WORKFORCE 88
(1988), to formalized preferences for candidates from underrepresented groups in the
workforce like those applied by Santa Clara County, California, see Johnson, 480 U.S. at
616-17, to the maintenance of separate pools of applicants or "race-norming" or
"within-group scoring" applicant credentials in order to draw a diverse workforce, see
Linda S. Blits & Jan H. Gottfredson, Employment Testing and Job Performance, PUB. INTER-
Esr, Winter 1990, at 18, 20. The latter practice has now come under attack in proposed
regulations of the Department of Labor aimed at scrapping the General Aptitude Test
Battery (GATB), the Labor Department's 1981 test that first gave rise to formal within-
group scoring mechanisms. See 55 Fed. Reg. 30162 (1990) (proposed July 18, 1990)
(proposing withdrawal of GATB testing system); Timothy Noah,Job Tests Scored on Racial
Curve Stir Controversy, WALL ST.J., Apr. 26, 1991, at B1. See generally Phyllis A. Wallace,
Affirmative Action from a Labor Market Perspective, Testimony before the Committee on the
Judiciary, House of Representatives, 101st Cong., 2d. Sess. 756 (March 20, 1990); Mark
Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in "General Ability"Job Testing, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1158,
1204-22 (1991); Alan Farnham, Holding Firm on Affirmative Action, FORTUNe, Mar. 13,
1989, at 87-88; Anne B. Fisher, Businessmen Like to Hire by the Numbers, FORTUNE, Sept. 16,
1985, at 26. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 now forbids employers "to adjust the scores
of, use different cutoff scores for, or otherwise alter the results of, employment related
tests on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 106, § 703(1) (1991).
The disjuncture extends far beyond the employment arena. To take one example,
the Department of Education recently decided that antidiscrimination principles require
that institutions of higher education not use race-specific scholarship or financial assist-
ance programs for minorities. See Michel Marriott, Colleges Basing Aid on Race Risk Loss of
Federal Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1990, at 1. Following an uproar over the impact that
this ruling would have on affirmative action policies, the Department of Education sub-
sequently revised its position and advised that colleges and universities continue to use
minority and race-based scholarships while the Department re-evaluates its position on
the issue. See Karen De Witt, Minority Scholarships Get Tentative Approval, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
21, 1991, at 16.
11 Civil Rights Act of 1990, S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (unenacted).
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Rights Act of 1991 which specifically targets the leading cases of the
1988 Term for legislative repudiation.12
Deep within the skirmishes that currently engage all branches
of the federal government lies the troubling case of Martin v.
Wilks, 13 in which the Supreme Court sustained the claim of white
firefighters in Birmingham, Alabama, that a civil rights consent de-
cree unfairly trampled their rights.' 4 Two important issues con-
verged in Martin. First, Martin raised a critical procedural question
of whether white incumbents not preferred by an affirmative action
remedy are barred by the collateral attack doctrine from challenging
the terms of a civil rights consent decree to which they are not a
party. 15 Second, and intrinsically related, Martin raised the question
of the nature of the substantive rights claimed by white incumbents
in the public sector even if they are not procedurally barred from
asserting those rights. 16 In ruling that the collateral attack doctrine
does not preclude challenge by nonparties to a civil rights consent
decree, a divided Supreme Court gave new vitality to the substantive
claims of dispreferred whites which invited a new wave of "reverse
discrimination" litigation.1
7
Not surprisingly, Martin was quickly joined with the principal
culprits of the Supreme Court's civil rights retreat. Because it was
decided in the same term of the Supreme Court and subsequently
singled out for statutory amendment, Martin appeared of a piece
with the more prominent civil rights reverses. Moreover, the fears
of the civil rights community were not unfounded. Martin has in-
deed prompted dozens of challenges to longstanding consent
decrees that had presumably concluded what was often first-genera-
tion litigation over the purposeful bar to black employment.' 8 As
expressed by the Senate Report accompanying the Civil Rights Act
12 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 105-108, § 703, sec.
112, § 706(e) (1991). This Article refers to the legislative history of the defeated 1990
Act, which was incorporated into the final 1991 Act. No new hearings were held in
1991, and in terms of the scope of this Article, the two bills are identical in their rejec-
tion of Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
13 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
14 See Ralston, supra note 2, at 217 (predicting attempt to statutorily overturn Martin
may become the most controversial provision" of the Civil Rights Act of 1990).
15 490 U.S. at 758.
16 490 U.S. at 771-73 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
17 490 U.S. at 791 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
18 See STEPHEN L. SPrrz, IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN MARTIN V.
WVILKS, PUBLICATION OF THE LAWYERS COMMITrEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW 14-28




of 1990, Martin stands accused of being an obstacle to "the speedy
and final resolution of employment discrimination cases." 1 9
This Article examines the validity of the charges laid at Martin's
door. This Article first addresses the actual issues in the Martin liti-
gation and contrasts the doctrinal analysis with the Court's prior
rulings on affirmative action consent decrees. Next, the Article ex-
amines the substantive claims advanced by the dispreferred incum-
bents and the procedural rights that follow from those claims. By
examining the competing interests in civil rights settlements, this
Article considers whether Martin was really cut from the same cloth
as the more prominent civil rights cases of the 1988 Term.
With some hesitation stemming from the author's background
as a civil rights lawyer,20 this Article concludes that the outcome in
Martin was inescapable, not because of the use of racial preferences
in remedying discrimination but because of the substantive constitu-
tional protections that must be afforded to the established expecta-
tion interests of incumbent, tenured public employees. These
substantive protections require an opportunity to be heard com-
mensurate with the protected interests, which for tenured public
employees is a constitutionally recognized property right. At the
level of doctrine, this Article shows that Martin is not simply differ-
ent from the cases signalling the retrenchment from civil rights but,
when analyzed from the vantage point of the rights of the dispre-
ferred, is constitutionally mandated.
At a fundamental level, the issue raised in Martin is how to equi-
tably distribute the social cost of remedying discrimination. As
structured in Birmingham, the cost of integrating the admittedly
discriminatory uniformed services was highly localized on an identi-
fiable group of incumbent employees. When asked to bear the cost
of remedying their employer's discrimination-to give up or defer
promotional opportunities and other job-related benefits-this
19 S. REP. No. 315, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1990). Congress has reiterated its
longstanding policy of encouraging voluntary settlement of employment discrimination
disputes in the Civil Rights Act of 1991: "Ihe use of alternative means of dispute
resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation, [etc.], is encouraged ... 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118 (1991).
20 The author was formerly a staff attorney with the Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law, the organization.that served as counsel to the black firefighters of
Birmingham. The author did not, however, have any participation in Martin v. Wilks or
any of the related litigation. For a similar viewpoint on Martin, see the shift in views of
Professor Joel Selig, a strong supporter of the Supreme Court's pre-1988 affirmative
action jurisprudence. See Selig, supra note 7. Professor Selig notes of Martin, "It is unu-
sual for a person of my background and views to find himself in agreement with both the
holding and the opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist in a controversial civil rights case
when Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens are in dissent." Joel Selig, Af-
firmative Action in Employment After Croson and Martin: The Legacy Remains Intact, 63 TEM-
pLE L. REv. 1, 22 (1990).
1992]
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group angrily, and predictably, recoiled. The more difficult, and
perhaps more controversial, conclusion is that this rebellion of the
incumbents was not simply a foreseeable response, but also an ap-
propriate response to the failure of the active discriminator, the City
of Birmingham, to distribute the costs of remedying discrimination
more equitably.
Ultimately, Martin is about the failure of procedural mecha-
nisms to circumvent the basic political and moral problem of how to
distribute the costs of remedying a history of discrimination. This
Article urges that parties to consent decrees be required to join all
persons whose settled, legally sanctioned expectations will be dis-
rupted. Absent such joinder, courts should bar the parties to the
consent decree from claiming any preclusive effect of the decree for
nonjoined third parties, and should prevent these parties from rely-
ing on the collateral attack doctrine to immunize the effects of the
consent decree from plenary review. Although reached from an
analysis that focuses on the substantive claims of the dispreferred,
this conclusion is in essence what Martin resolves. Insofar as the
Birmingham decision forces courts to openly address the cost calcu-
lus of remedying discrimination as part of the consent decree pro-
cess, it may allow for settlements of discrimination claims on a more
lasting and equitable basis.
II
CIVIL RIGHTS CONSENT DECREES
The Birmingham litigation, culminating in Martin, embodies all
the tragic conflicts endemic to the attempt to remedy racial discrimi-
nation. It begins with a virulent history of officially directed segre-
gation, continues through long and arduous litigation to end this
discrimination, and ultimately winds up in a rather naked battle over
how to distribute the costs of remedying past discrimination. But
the customary conflict between claims of discrimination in the past
and reverse discrimination present in future remedies was played
out, by virtue of the convoluted history of the Birmingham litiga-
tion, as rather arcane procedural debates. The doctrines of preclu-
sion and finality served as the proxies for the more basic issues of
rights to jobs and equality of employment opportunity. It is there-
fore necessary to turn our attention briefly both to the history of the
Martin litigation, and to the doctrinal battles played out in Supreme
Court cases and in the statutory response to Martin.
A. Birmingham's Segregated Workforce Under Challenge
The desegregation of the Birmingham municipal workforce,
and particularly its unifbrmed services, holds special symbolic sig-
[Vol. 77:189
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nificance to the struggle for black equality. Among the most rivet-
ing images of the civil rights movement are the dramatic news
photos of early 1963 showing the fire department's high-power
water hoses and the police department's attack dogs being turned
on protesters who demanded an end to the segregation of the
downtown Birmingham commercial district.21 Under the leadership
of the notorious Public Safety Commissioner, Eugene "Bull"
Connor, the Birmingham police and fire departments became syn-
onymous with the use of official lawlessness against the civil rights
movement. 22
The attempt to desegregate the uniformed services of Birming-
ham must be viewed against the background of persistent discrimi-
natory hiring practices that remained largely unaffected by Brown v.
Board ofEducation and subsequent attempts to dismantle dejure seg-
regation. Even after Brown, official, city job announcements still re-
quired that applicants be white for the more favorable positions,
including those in the uniformed services. Birmingham did not hire
its first black police officer until 1966, its first black firefighter until
1968, nor its second black firefighter until 1974-when the suit re-
sulting in Martin was originally filed. 23 Between the time the first
and second black firefighters were hired, 170 whites were hired in a
city that was approaching a black population majority.
24
Little changed until 1974, when two groups of black plaintiffs
filed suit claiming discriminatory hiring practices by the City of Bir-
mingham, the surrounding Jefferson County, and their personnel
boards. 25 The following year, the United States Department of Jus-
tice filed suit as well.26 In 1981, after plaintiffs prevailed on liabil-
ity, 27 but prior to the entry of any remedial orders, the parties
reached a negotiated settlement on remedy. Thus, the decision of
the City of Birmingham and its administrative personnel board on
21 See DAvIDJ. GARROW, BEARING THE CROss 231-63 (1986) (discussing the drive led
by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., to defeat official segregation in Birmingham).
22 See WILLIAM A. NUNNELLEY, BULL CONNOR 86-128 (1991).
23 Civil Rights Act of 1990: Hearings on S. 2104 Before the Committee on Labor and Human
Resources, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 367-68 (1990) (hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of
Mayor Richard Arrington of Birmingham).
24 Id. See also Nunnelley, supra note 22, at 75-76 (reporting that in 1953 Birming-
ham was the only city of more than 50,000 in'the South that had an all-white police force
and that this continued into the 1960s).
25 See Hearings, supra note 23, at 367-68 (testimony of Major Richard Arrington of
Birmingham).
26 United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1514 (11th Cir. 1983) (re-
counting procedural history of the litigation).
27 id. at 1514-15. The finding of liability had already been upheld on appeal.
Ensley Branch of the NAACP v. Seibels, 616 F.2d 812 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, Personnel
Bd. v. United States, 449 U.S. 1061 (1980). The court predicated its finding of liability
on the use of unvalidated tests to screen police and firefighter applicants.
19921
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May 19, 1981 to abandon a seven-year fight against challenges to its
hiring and promotional practices marked a watershed event in the
struggle for black equality.
Under the terms of the consent decree, the defendants agreed
to alter their hiring practices in order to facilitate black employment
and to adopt affirmative action programs at both the hiring and pro-
motional stages. As part of the decree, Birmingham was enjoined
from engaging in any acts or practices having either the purpose or
effect of discriminating on the basis of race.28 The decree was in-
tended to move forcibly the still overwhelmingly white uniformed
services of Birmingham, inherited from the reign of Bull Connor,
toward a more equitable reflection of the City's half-black labor
force. As with numerous consent decrees entered into by the Justice
Department, the decree set forth a hiring and promotional goal of
achieving a workforce composition representative of the local labor
force.29
Instead of resolving the conflict and setting a smooth course for
desegregation of the City's workforce, however, the consent decree
triggered a new spate of litigation, this time by incumbent white
firefighters. 30 The new controversy began with the August 1981
fairness hearings, at which the district court was to consider the ob-
jections of all interested parties. Representatives of white firefight-
ers filed objections as amicus curiae at the fairness hearing and
sought to intervene on the grounds that the proposed decree would
adversely affect their rights. The district court denied the motion,
noting that "[t]his litigation has been pending for over five years
and has been vigorously contested by the existing parties through
two trials and one appeal .... [I]ntervention at this time as parties
to the litigation is clearly untimely and must be denied." 31 A group
of white firefighters then filed an independent action,32 seeking in-
28 United States v. Jefferson County, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 1834 (N.D.
Ala. 1981).
29 See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 758 (1989); Hearings, supra note 23, at 370
(testimony of Mayor Richard Arrington of Birmingham).
30 United States v.Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1515 (11 th Cir. 1983) (setting
forth procedural history of case).
31 United States v. Jefferson County, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1834, 1839
(N.D. Ala. 1981). For other cases in which courts have denied intervention when incum-
bents or their unions have sought to challenge a consent decree, see Dennison v. City of
Los Angeles, 658 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1981); Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15 (1st Cir.
1980); Alaniz v. Tillie Lewis Foods, 572 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, Beaver v. Alaniz,
439 U.S. 837 (1978); Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, Fire
Officers Union v. Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. 921 (1976); EEOC v. ET & WNC Transp. Co.,
81 F.R.D. 371 (W.D. Tenn. 1978); Firebird Soc'y, Inc. v. New Haven Bd. of Fire
Comm'rs. 66 F.R.D. 457 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
867 (1975).
32 Jefferson County, 720 F.2d at 15t-
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junctive relief against the operation of the consent decrees; the
plaintiffs claimed that the decrees affected the incumbents' promo-
tional opportunities which arose from pre-existing promotional
practices. 33 The district court denied this relief as well.34 The court
of appeals affirmed both the denial of intervention and the denial of
injunctive relief.35
In 1983, a separate group of white firefighters filed suit,3 6
claiming that they were entitled to promotions under the pre-
existing promotional system and would have obtained those promo-
tions but for the City's reliance on the consent decrees to alter the
system of promotions. The new action sought to enjoin the imple-
mentation of the terms of the consent decrees insofar as it denied
incumbents the promotions that, the plaintiffs claimed, the City was
obligated to provide them. The district court dismissed this action,
finding that the white challengers were procedurally precluded,
under the collateral attack rule, from attacking the terms of a court-
approved consent decree. 37 The Eleventh Circuit then reversed on
33 Prior to the 1981 consent decrees, promotion in the Birmingham uniformed
services required seniority-based eligibility for promotional examinations. As of 1980,
immediately prior to the consent decrees that gave rise to Martin, 490 U.S. 755 (1989),
the requirement for eligibility to take the fire department lieutenant examination was
five years of service and satisfactory efficiency ratings. Pursuant to state law, the Jeffer-
son County Personnel Board administered and certified the results of promotional ex-
aminations that were given to firefighters who had sufficient seniority with the
Birmingham Fire Department. Individuals were referred to the Fire Department in the
order of their scores on the examination. Three eligible candidates were referred at a
time, plus one additional candidate for each available position. Thus, if there were five
slots open, the Board would refer the top seven exam scorers from which the fire depart-
ment would select five. Telephone Interview with Diane Clark, Director of Personnel
Bd.,Jefferson County, Alabama (Mar. 13, 1991). See also Ensley Branch of the NAACP v.
Jefferson County, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 670 (N.D. Ala. 1977). Although exam-
inations for entry-level positions were struck down as having an adverse impact and as
not having been properly validated, Ensley Branch of the NAACP v. Seibels, 616 F.2d
812 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, Personnel Bd. v. United States, 449 U.S. 1061 (1980), no
litigated resolution of the status of the promotional examinations had emerged. See In re
Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir.
1987), aff'd sub nom. Martin, 490 U.S. 755 (1989). Thus, at the time of the consent de-
crees, the established promotional system was based on seniority-eligibility for a promo-
tional examination, followed by the "group of three" system for actual promotion. That
remained in effect until the parties agreed to the consent decree, which required one-
for-one black-white promotions and an expansion of the group of three in order to as-
sure a sufficient black applicant pool from which to draw eligible blacks for promotion.
United States v.Jefferson County, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1834, 1837 (N.D. Ala.
1981). The "reverse discrimination" charges leading up to Martin were brought by
groups of white firefighters who claimed they would have been promoted based on the
pre-existing system but for the City's compliance with the consent decrees. In re Birming-
ham, 833 F.2d at 1495.
34 Jefferson County, 720 F.2d at 1515.
35 Id.
36 See In re Birmingham, 833 F.2d at 1495.
37 Id
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the ground that, since the white firefighters were not parties to the
original consent decrees, their claims of unlawful discrimination
were not precluded. 38 In 1989, a narrowly divided Supreme Court
held in Martin v. Wilks 39 that Birmingham's white firefighters were
not procedurally barred from attacking the terms of the consent de-
cree as it pertained to their promotional expectations.
Writing for the five-justice majority, Justice Rehnquist rejected
the argument that the white firefighters, as potentially affected par-
ties, had a duty to come forward to protect their interests, as
through intervention under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, or else risk foreclosure of future claims. 40 Instead, Jus-
tice Rehnquist urged that the joinder procedures under Rule 19 of
the Federal Rules be utilized to allow the parties to the proceeding
to join any third parties whom they desired be bound by the litiga-
tion.4 1 Under pressure from the dissent, the Court acknowledged
the potential burdens of identifying all parties who might conceiva-
bly be adversely affected by a decree. Nonetheless, the Court held,
the fundamentals of "anglo-American jurisprudence" dictate "that
one is not bound by ajudgment inpersonam in which he is not desig-
nated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service
of process." 42
Writing for the dissent, Justice Stevens rejected an immunity
from the effects of a judgment for persons "who merely have the
kind of interest that may as a practical matter be impaired by the
outcome of a case" and who choose to sit on the sidelines.43 The
dissent offered two primary justifications for binding the white
firefighters to the terms of the consent decrees. First, according to
Justice Stevens, the consent decrees were unobjectionable because
they did not deprive the dispreferred white firefighters of any con-
tractual rights, such as seniority, or of any other legal claims.44 Sec-
ond, even if the decree affected some rights of the incumbents as a
practical matter, some limited grounds for collateral attack re-
mained if overriding new evidence or evidence of collusion or fraud
were discovered.45 Since the white challengers failed to present evi-
38 Id.
39 490 U.S. 755, 769 (1989).
40 Id. at 763 ("The law does not impose upon any person absolutely entitled to a
hearing the burden of voluntary intervention in a suit to which he is a stranger....
Unless duly summoned to appear in a legal proceeding, a pe'son not a privy may rest
assured that a judgment recovered therein will not affect his legal rights.") (quoting
Chase Nat'l Bank v. Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, 441 (1934))).
41 Id. at 764-68.
42 Id. at 761 (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)).
13 Id. at 769 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 770.
45 Id. at 783-87.
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dence calling into question the validity of the consent decrees, they
should be bound by the legal consequences of their decision not to
participate more actively in the early stages of the litigation.
B. Procedural Bars to Third-Party Challenges
In affirming the Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme Court signifi-
cantly retreated from its three-year-old decision in Local No. 93, In-
ternational Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland.46 In the Cleveland
Firefighters case, the Court held that similarly affected incumbent
white firefighters were foreclosed from challenging a Cleveland con-
sent decree. The underlying facts of the Cleveland and Birmingham
litigations are unfortunately both similar and familiar. After a long-
standing history of racial discrimination in municipal employment,
which had led to litigated decrees against hiring and promotional
practices in the police department 47 and hiring practices in the fire
department,48 the City of Cleveland finally attempted to settle a
challenge by black firefighters to its promotional policies. During
settlement negotiations, the union representing incumbent em-
ployees intervened, seeking to defend established promotional
practices.
49
The critical difference between the Birmingham and Cleveland
litigations lies in the Cleveland white firefighters' successful motion
to intervene. Once made party to the lawsuit, the firefighters' union
unwaveringly opposed any settlement of the litigation that would
alter established promotional practices, and at one point even sub-
mitted the matter to the vote of its membership. 50 Despite the op-
position of the intervenors, the district court approved a consent
decree between the City of Cleveland and the black firefighters
group that significantly altered the promotional practices of the fire
department to allow for affirmative action-based promotions. 51
Once approved, however, the critical question remained: whether
the decree would bind all parties to the litigation, including the in-
tervenors who had opposed its entry. This was precisely the result
the Martin Court refused to reach regarding nonparty opposition.
46 478 U.S. 501 (1986).
47 See Shield Club v. City of Cleveland, 370 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
48 See Headen v. City of Cleveland, No. C73-330 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 25, 1975), quoted
in Cleveland Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 506.
49 Cleveland Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 506-07.
50 Id. at 509 (union members overwhelmingly voted down terms of proposed con-
sent decree).
51 Id at 512.
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Although the litigation was framed in terms of the permissibility
of affirmative action remedies under Tite VII, 52 the Supreme Court
in Cleveland Firefighters had to confront the possibility that the entry
of the decree might yield the apparently unseemly result of a party's
being bound by a nonadjudicated decree entered over its objection.
The Court evaded this problem by appearing to limit both the inter-
ests of the intervenors and the scope of the decree:
Of course, parties who choose to resolve litigation through settle-
ment may not dispose of the claims of a third party, and afortiori
may not impose duties or obligations on a third party, without
that party's agreement. A court's approval of a consent decree
between some of the parties therefore cannot dispose of the valid
claims of nonconsenting intervenors; if properly raised, these
claims remain and may be litigated by the intervenor .... How-
ever, the consent decree entered here does not bind [the inter-
venor firefighters' union] to do or not to do anything. It imposes
no legal duties on the Union at all; only the parties to the decree
can be held in contempt of court for failure to comply with its
terms.53
Despite the Court's disclaimer, a consent decree governing promo-
tional activities, in practice, will either affect the rights of all employ-
ees who are in line for promotions with the consenting employer,54
or be worthless. Unless a decree can serve as a defense to liability
for any claimed breach of contract brought against the consenting
employer by dispreferred employees, the decree provides no pro-
tection to the settling parties from subsequent challenge. Despite
the Court's avoidance of the preclusion issue in Cleveland Firefighters,
52 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2005g (1988). The
sole issue presented in the petition for certiorari was whether the consent decree was a
permissible remedy under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 706(g) (discrimination in employment
on account of race). Cleveland Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 513.
53 Cleveland Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 529.
54 The Court's opinion must be read against the backdrop of the 1966 Amendment
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), which allows intervention of right when "the
applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair
or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest." This Amendment rejected a
strict interpretation of Rule 24 which required the applicant to have a direct legal inter-
est in the litigation. Advisory Committee's Note to Amendments to Rule 24, 39 F.R.D.
69, 109-11 (1966).
So long as the intervenor is not estopped from independently litigating any legal
claims it may have against either of the parties, the narrow holding of the Court is cor-
rect. For example, if the white firefighters in subsequent proceedings were able to raise
independent arguments, such as the property-based due process claims suggested in
this Article, then the inability to pursue these claims in the initial litigation between the
City of Cleveland and black aspirants would be of no concern to the incumbent
firefighters. As Professor Larry Kramer notes, the firefighters would not be parties to
the underlying dispute between the City and the alleged discriminatees and should not
be able to assume defenses for the Cityjus tertii. Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the
Rights of Third Parties, 87 MICH. L_ REV. 321, 353-54 (1988).
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in practice the entry of the decree would likely have concrete effects
on third parties. It is doubtful that courts, having stamped their ap-
proval on a prior resolution of the dispute, would entertain de novo
challenges brought by third parties without reference to the consent
decree as the legal baseline.55 Of necessity, the potential preclusive
effect of the consent decree in Cleveland Firefighters is what rose to the
fore.
Prior to Cleveland Firefighters, courts were divided on how to as-
sess the third-party effects of bipolar civil rights consent decrees;
these decrees are settlements between institutional defendants and
minority claimants. The strongest resistance to precluding in-
dependent challenges by the dispreferred emerged when the af-
fected rights were secured by a collective bargaining agreement,
rather than by civil service regulations as in Birmingham. In United
States v. City of Miami,56 for example, the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc
rejected a proposed settlement between the United States and the
City that was opposed by two police organizations which were also
named as defendants. The court held that since parts of the decree
would alter entrenched seniority rights that had been secured under
a collective bargaining agreement, the court could not enter those
parts of the decree over the objection of the certified bargaining
representative, the Fraternal Order of Police.5 7 A similar result was
reached in United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc. ,58 in which
the Fifth Circuit directly addressed the traditional role of unions in
securing seniority rights as part of the process of collective bargain-
ing. The court concluded that it could not deny participation as in-
tervenors to the designated representative of the affected employees
since "it would be anomalous to assume in such cases that the em-
ployees' bargaining representative's interest is adequately served by
the government or the employer." 59
Nonetheless, the bulk of doctrinal authority prior to Martin as-
signed to bipolar consent decrees precisely the preclusive effect that
55 See, e.g., Pulitzer-Polster v. Pulitzer, 784 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding that
similarity of issues presented between state and federal litigation requires nondiverse
parties to be joined in federal action because of practical impact of one adjudication on
the other). See also Douglas Laycock, Consent Decrees Without Consent: The Rights of Noncon-
senting Third Parties, 1987 U. C. LEGAL F. 103, 120 (evaluating likelihood of court an-
tagonism to third parties that force a reopening of case in which consent decree already
entered).
56 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981).
57 664 F.2d at 445-47. See also EEOC v. AT&T, 365 F. Supp. 1105, aff'd in part,
appeal dismissed in part, 506 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1974) (upholding right of intervention of a
labor union as a defendant because of effect of proposed decree on collective bargaining
rights), consent decrees upheld, 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977).
58 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, Harris v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 425
U.S. 944 (1976).
59 Id. at 845.
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the Court tried to sidestep in Cleveland Firefighters. Thus, the Elev-
enth Circuit's square rejection of the collateral attack rule in the
Martin litigation 60 represented the minority view on procedural
bars. In virtually all other courts, once a consent decree received a
judicial imprimatur, no further challenge to its terms would be
brooked. 6' That rule was terminated by the clear holding of Martin:
"A judgment or decree among parties to a lawsuit resolves issues as
among them, but it does not conclude the rights of strangers to
those proceedings. "
62
Had Martin come out the other way, with the burden of inter-
vening on the incumbents who were seeking to preserve their sen-
iority-based claims, the results would have been truly striking. The
Martin dissent would have allowed the incumbent white firefighters
the right of intervention to oppose the terms of the consent decree.
Under Cleveland Firefighters, however, the district court would have
retained the authority to enter the decree regardless of the opposi-
tion of the white incumbents. The collateral attack rule would in
turn extinguish the incumbents' legal claims, making their participa-
tion as intervenors essentially worthless.
C. The Statutory Response of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
According to civil rights advocates, Martin as presently con-
strued is an obstacle to any kind of finality in civil rights cases, since
individuals adversely affected by a consent decree may present
themselves at any time in the future.63 Hence, section 108 of the
60 See In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492,
1498 (11 th Cir. 1987) (because the white firefighters "were neither parties nor privies to
the consent decrees . . . their independent claims of unlawful discrimination are not
precluded"), aff'd sub nom. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
61 For cases from various circuits applying the collateral attack rule, see, e.g., Striff
v. Mason, 849 F.2d 240, 245 (6th Cir. 1988); Marino v. Ortiz, 806 F.2d 1144, 1146-47
(2d Cir. 1986), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 301 (1988); Devereaux v. Geary,
765 F.2d 268 (Ist Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986); Thaggard v. City of
Jackson, 687 F.2d 66, 68-69 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, Ashley v. City ofJackson, 464
U.S. 900 (1983); Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541, 558 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd
on othergiounds sub nom. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984);
Dennison v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 658 F.2d 694, 696 (9th Cir.
1981); Coins v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 657 F.2d 62, 64 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 940 (1982); Society Hill Civic Ass'n v. Harris, 632 F.2d 1045, 1052 (3d Cir. 1980);
Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1980). But see Dunn v. Carey, 808 F.2d 555,
559-60 (7th Cir. 1986) (declining to adopt collateral attack bar).
62 Martin v. Wilks 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989).
63 See Hearings, supra note 23, at 566 (testimony of Laurence Tribe) (there could
never be finality because some 19-year-old could come forward at any time to claim
denial of lifelong dream of being a firefighter); id. at 569 (finality impossible without
collateral bar); zd. at 539 (testimony of Mayor Arrington of Birmingham) (same). See also
Frank E. Deale, Martin v. Wilks, 7 N.Y.L. SCH. J. Hut. RTs. 83, 90 (1990) ("It will be
virtually impossible to identify all individuals who might seek to relitigate the issues that
have been resolved by the consent decree.").
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Civil Rights Act of 1991 attempts legislatively to overturn Martin
and to reintroduce prohibitions against third-party attacks on con-
sent decrees that are similar to those in place under the case law
prior to Martin. This statutory provision attempts to insulate court-
approved consent decrees in employment discrimination cases from
third-party challenge by reintroducing a modified form of the collat-
eral attack doctrine.
Under new section 108, collateral challenges to consent decrees
would be precluded under two circumstances: First, when a third
party had actual notice of the proposed judgment "sufficient to ap-
prise such person that such judgment or order might adversely af-
fect the interests and legal rights of such person" and when such
person was afforded "a reasonable opportunity to present objec-
tions to such judgment or order";4 and second, when a third party
without such notice and opportunity to present objections was
nonetheless adequately represented by another third-party chal-
lenger.65 The congressional intent as expressed by the 1990 version
of the Act, was to find a "middle ground between the strict rule bar-
ring collateral attacks, and the unacceptable approach taken by the
Supreme Court in [Martin v.] Wilks."
66
The new statute leaves two critical issues untouched. The first
concerns the rights affected by the "middle ground" approach; the
statute fails to distinguish among types of affected interests held by
the third parties to whom notice must be provided. As this Article
demonstrates, the adequacy of procedural protections to potentially
affected third parties cannot be analyzed independent of the sub-
stantive rights claimed by the third parties. The second issue con-
cerns the extent of the process due to third parties. The statute fails
to address the adequacy of judicial review afforded to the claims of
affected third parties, as governed by the underlying rights claimed,
when these parties are given a "reasonable opportunity to present
objections."' 67 Instead, the legislation focuses exclusively on the ob-
stacles to the resolution of the dispute between the primary liti-
gants. The legislative history repeatedly targets the "inefficiency
and unfairness of the [Martin v. ] Wilks rule"68 in obligating parties to
64 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 108, § 703(n)(1)(B)(i)(I) &
(II) (1991) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2).
65 Idl sec. 108, § 703(n)(1)(B)(ii).
66 H.R. REP. No. 644, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1990).
67 The sole exception is the rather bizarre limitation in § 108(n)(2)(D) which ex-
pressly restricts interpretation of the statute to not "authorize or permit the denial to
any person of the due process of law required by the Constitution." Since the denial of
constitutional rights is not a power ordinarili committed to congressional acts, it is not
clear what this section means.
68 S. REP. No. 315, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1990).
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a consent decree to join as additional parties all nonparties who are
to be bound by the terms of the decree. "Without remedial legisla-
tion," the Senate Report on the 1990 Act concludes, "Congress's
intent in adopting Title VII of 'encouraging voluntary settlements of
employment discrimination claims' will be frustrated." 69
III
THE SUBSTANTIVE CLAIMS OF INCUMBENTS
The Cleveland and Birmingham cases present starkly contrast-
ing views of the effect of settlements between public bodies and
minority challengers on the entrenched rights of the predominantly
white incumbents. This issue is particularly striking in the restruc-
turing of promotional opportunities for incumbents under the terms
of an affirmative action decree. In such circumstances, the costs of
disrupting settled expectations are easily defined, the cost bearers
are easily identified, and the combination of these two factors is
likely to prompt relitigation of the initial claims under the new guise
of reverse discrimination.
These cases reveal a disturbing tendency on the part of state
entities to attempt to evade the consequences of unlawful discrimi-
nation by passing the costs of remedial action onto unrepresented
third parties, 70 a pattern well within the ambit of protection of the
procedural due process case law.
The visibility and emotional nature of the reverse discrimina-
tion label masks the presence of independent substantive rights
meriting careful legal evaluation in the approval and enforcement of
consent decrees. It is far too late to contend that tenured, seniority-
protected public employees have no legally cognizable interests in
decrees which require a reordering of seniority rights. Decades of
affirmative action and procedural due process cases recognize that
incumbent employees have a substantial property interest in their
jobs. 71 The property interests in employment are accompanied by
elaborate procedural protections to protect incumbents from loss of
their employment benefits to the vagaries of political expediency.
A. Beyond the "Reverse Discrimination" Label
The Supreme Court confronted the effects of affirmative action
on the employment rights of the dispreferred in seven cases prior to
69 Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88
n.14 (1981)).
70 See Laycock, supra note 55, at 114-17 (describing incentives to pass costs at settle-
ment onto unrepresented parties).
71 See text accompanying notes 130-49.
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Martin.72 Each of these cases involved challenges brought by af-
fected incumbent employees concerning the permissibility of racial
or sexual preferences that were granted as a remedy to perceived or
established patterns of discrimination. Thus, the cases give the ini-
tial appearance of attempting to define an uneasy boundary between
the permissible margins of remedial affirmative action programs and
the impermissible emergence of "reverse discrimination."
7 3
The focus on a model based upon the discrimination-reverse
discrimination duality is readily explained by the most visible divi-
sions on the Court. Between the poles of Marshall and Brennan on
one end74 and Rehnquist and Scalia on the other,75 the most visi-
ble-and vituperative-division of the Court on affirmative action
has turned on the use of racial or sexual classifications in setting
hiring or promotional preferences. The Court has repeatedly di-
vided between the competing views that affirmative action is neces-
sarily a form of reverse discrimination at one extreme,76 and that
72 Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); United States v. Para-
dise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland,
478 U.S. 501 (1986); Local 28 of the Sheetmetal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S.
421 (1986); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Firefighters Local
Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 442 U.S.
193 (1979).
73 Although the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence arises under both the
Constitution and Title VII, it is difficult to discern any meaningful difference between
the standards applied. See George Rutherglen & Daniel R. Ortiz, Affirmative Action Under
the Constitution and Title VII: From Confusion to Convergence, 35 UCLA L. REV. 467 (1988).
Some early opinions tried to distinguish the parameters of discretionary affirmative ac-
tion based on whether or not state action was involved. See Weber, 442 U.S. 193 (majority
opinion of Brennan, J.). No basis for any distinction was ever articulated by the Court
and, by the later cases of the 1980s, the occasional references to distinct statutory or
constitutional standards were reserved for polemical asides. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 627
n.6. Nor does such a distinction appear particularly availing in light of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2005g (1988), which extended
Title VII to reach state governmental employers on the same basis as private sector
employers. See generally STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR
AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D CONG., 2D SEss., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOY-
MEN r ACT OF 1972 (Comm. Print 1972).
74 Of the seven significant affirmative action cases on employment decided before
the 1988 Term, Marshall and Brennan voted to uphold the affirmative action program in
all seven. Justice Blackmun voted in favor all seven times as well, see Selig, supra note 7,
at 305 n.32, although his views in Weber were more nuanced than those of Brennan and
Marshall. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 211-14 (Blackmun,J., concurring) (advocating an argua-
ble violation standard as the predicate for voluntary affirmative action programs).
75 In the seven principal affirmative action cases on employment prior to the 1988
Term, Justice Rehnquist voted against the preferences in all seven. Selig, supra note 7,
at 305 n.32. Justice Scalia voted against the preferences in Paradise and Johnson, the two
cases in which he participated. Id.
76 See, e.g., Cleveland Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 533 (White, J., dissenting) (use of racial
classifications to disadvantage whites makes Title VII "a one-way racial street, thus dis-
serving the goal of ending racial discrimination in this country").
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preferences designed to remedy the effects of past societal discrimi-
nation are legally benign at the other.77
For the Brennan-Marshall wing of the Court, Title VII and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment78 provide a
remedial tool for ameliorating the conditions of historically disad-
vantaged groups. As expressed by Justice Blackmun, "In order to
get beyond racism, we must first take account of race.... [I]n order
to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently." 7 9
The Rehnquist-Scalia wing, on the other hand, takes both the
statutory and constitutional commands of nondiscrimination as a
sweeping prohibition on the use of race- or sex-based classifications:
"There is perhaps no device more destructive to the notion of
equality than the numerus clausus-the quota. Whether described as
'benign discrimination' or 'affirmative action,' the racial quota is
nonetheless a creator of castes, a two-edged sword that must de-
mean one in order to prefer another."80 Under this view, the sole
permissible reference to racial classifications comes in the process of
remedying proven discrimination against discrete, identifiable indi-
viduals.8 1 In such a situation, restoring individuals to the positions
they would have held absent discrimination is in fact a make-whole
remedy that does not rest on racial classifications at all. For this
wing of the Court, the affirmative use of classifications "effectively
replace[s] the goal of a discrimination-free society with the quite in-
compatible goal of proportionate representation by race and by sex
in the workplace."8 2 In such circumstances, runs the argument, the
"fundamental principle" that "discrimination on the basis of race is
illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive
of democratic society" is replaced by the uncompelling credo that
discrimination becomes "only a matter of whose ox is gored."
8 3
77 See, e.g.,Johnson, 480 U.S. at 637 (affirmative action plan permissible when aimed
at eliminating "work force imbalances").
78 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. By the time of Wygant and Johnson, the Court's
occasional distinctions between the treatment of Title VII and Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection claims lacked any doctrinal content. See Rutherglen & Ortiz, supra note
73, at 503 (discussing fundamental similarity of Title VII and constitutional standards).
79 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,
separate opinion).
80 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 254 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
81 See Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501,
539-43 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (court-sanctioned racial quotas "evil" unless
aimed at providing "make-whole relief only to those who have been actual victims of
illegal discrimination" (478 U.S. at 540 (quoting Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 579 (1984)))).
82 Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 658 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
83 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975).
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The controversy in Martin thus seems to fit into a neat model of
competing claims of discrimination and reverse discrimination. On
this view, the claims of the incumbent Birmingham firefighters sim-
ply represent the typical reverse discrimination claim that accompa-
nies the typical remedial affirmative action decree. This anticipates
that the courts will restrict the claims of the dispreferred (the initial
nonparties) to the same cause of action that would have been
brought if the discrimination initially had been directed at the dis-
preferred group. Certainly this was the understanding of the court
of appeals in Martin when it affirmed the denial of the white
firefighters' motion to intervene; the court of appeals reasoned that
the firefighters were free to "institut[e] an independent Tide VII
suit, asserting... specific violations of their rights. '8 4 This was also
the understanding of the white firefighters who then accepted the
invitation and filed their independent Title VII claim charging the
Birmingham authorities with impermissible use of racial classifica-
tions in implementing the consent decree.
85
This view of the merits of the litigation actually lends some sup-
port to the use of the collateral attack bar. If the incumbents' claim
was simply that of reverse discrimination, no different from that of
any other dispreferred group, the adjudicated history of racial dis-
crimination and the demonstrated need for a remedy might well be
dispositive of the merits of all discrimination claims. So framed,
there is a stronger argument for binding all potentially affected par-
ties to the outcome of the initial case. Under such circumstances, a
district court passing on the propriety of a consent decree could at
least have the full parameters of all potential issues available from
the records of the discrimination claim. The resulting resolution of
the discrimination-reverse discrimination claims would exhaust the
universe of possible interests in dispute.
This view misconceives the stakes in the Birmingham litigation
in two fundamental ways. First, it misses the key doctrinal step in
the pre-1988 Supreme Court jurisprudence: the focus on the mag-
nitude of the cost to the dispreferred. Second, it does not distin-
guish the substantive claims to entitlement of incumbent employees
from those of mere aspirants to positions whose prospects for any
given job might be adversely affected by an affirmative action
decree.
84 United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1518 (11th Cir. 1983).
85 Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 758 (1989). See also Cleveland Firefighters, 478 U.S.
at 512-13 (similar understanding of the contours of the Cleveland litigation by the white
firefighters).
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B. The Burdens of Remedies
The focus on discrimination-reverse discrimination ignores the
critical inquiry that defined the Supreme Court's affirmative action
jurisprudence throughout the 1980s. Between the Brennan-
Marshall and Rehnquist-Scalia wings of the Court stood the decid-
ing swing votes of Justices Powell and O'Connor.8 6 For the middle
of the Court, two issues determined the propriety of remedial racial
or sexual preferences. The first was the extent of the compelling
interest in desegregating the workforce or, as it appeared in the
cases, the extent to which the parties could create a record justifying
the employer's interest in resorting to remedial measures without
recourse to litigation.8 7 The second and perhaps most important
factor was the cost to the dispreferred in terms of disrupting settled
expectations.
This understanding of the issue is evident in Justice Powell's
plurality opinion in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education.88 In Wygant,
the Court struck down an affirmative action plan for schoolteachers
in Jackson, Michigan, which would have resulted in the layoff of
white teachers in favor of less senior black teachers. Justice Powell
freely conceded that "[a]s part of this Nation's dedication to eradi-
cating racial discrimination, innocent persons may be called upon to
bear some of the burden of the remedy."8 9 However, that recogni-
tion opened up the critical issues: how great are the burdens, and
how broadly or narrowly are they spread? In other words, the criti-
cal questions are how localized those costs are to be in terms of the
number of individuals forced to bear those costs, and how exacting
those costs would be for the affected individuals.
From this perspective, the Court's jurisprudence through the
1980s divides along a continuum with surprisingly well-defined con-
tours. At one end are the hiring cases in which "the burden to be
borne by innocent individuals is diffused to a considerable extent
86 Justice Powell voted against the proposed preferences twice and in favor four
times, while Justice O'Connor voted in favor twice and against four times. Selig, supra
note 7, at 305 n.32.
87 The best example is the discussion by Justice O'Connor in Wygant:
[P]ublic employers are trapped between the competing hazards of liabil-
ity to minorities if affirmative action is not taken to remedy apparent em-
ployment discrimination and liability to nonminorities if affirmative
action is taken. Where the employers ... act on the basis of information
which gives them a sufficient basis for concluding that remedial action is
necessary, a contemporaneous findings [of liability] requirement should
not be necessary.
Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 291 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
88 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
89 Id. at 280-81;see also Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 777 (1976) (in
remedying discrimination, "sharing of the burden" not impermissible).
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among society generally." 90 At the other extreme are the layoff
cases, in which the costs are more direct and dramatic. According to
Justice Powell, "While hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often
foreclosing only one of several opportunities, layoffs impose the en-
tire burden of achieving racial equality on particular individuals,
often resulting in serious disruption of their lives. The burden is
too intrusive." 91 Thus, according to this view, "[d]enial of a future
employment opportunity is not as intrusive as loss of an existing
job."92 Not only are the costs highly localized in the affected em-
ployees, but the cost to each employee is overwhelming. For a se-
nior, tenured employee, "the rights and expectations surrounding
seniority make up what is probably the most valuable capital asset
that the worker 'owns,' .worth even more than the current equity in
his home."93
Throughout the 1980s, the Supreme Court approved of no af-
firmative action plan in which the result of a racial or sexual
classification would have "unsettled [a] legitimate firmly rooted ex-
pectation"9 4 of the dispreferred employee;95 such an expectation is
most clearly distilled in cases in which the affirmative action plan
would have cost the dispreferred employees their jobs. Until the
1988 Term, the Supreme Court departed from its relatively tolerant
view of affirmative action only "when an issue of cost allocation to
innocents [lies] on the surface of a lawsuit." 96
As developed below, the focus on the costs to the dispreferred,
particularly in cases affecting public employees, dovetails with an in-
dependent body of case law that assures due process protection of
property-based entitlements to employment. Although the parallels
to the due process employment case law go unmentioned in the af-
firmative action jurisprudence, the Court's attentiveness to the im-
pact of preferences on the rights of the dispreferred is nonetheless
consistent with a respect for the security of individual claims against
90 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282.
91 Id. at 283 (footnote omitted).
92 Id. at 282-83; see also id. at 295 (White, J., concurring in the judgment)
("Whatever the legitimacy of hiring goals or quotas may be, the discharge of white
teachers to make room for blacks, none of whom has been shown to be a victim of any
racial discrimination, is quite a different matter.").
93 Fallon & Weiler, supra note 7, at 58. See also Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283 (citing
Fallon & Weiler for this proposition).
94 Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987).
95 See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 567-68 n.2 (1984)
(lower court's injunction against seniority-based layoffs "direct[ly]" resulted in three lay-
offs of white employees with more seniority than blacks who retained their jobs); Wygant,
476 U.S. at 270-72 (collective bargaining agreement provided for a freeze in minority
layoffs so that nonminority teachers were laid off before minority teachers with less
seniority).
96 Fallon & Weiler, supra note 7, at 29.
1992] 209
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
majoritarian intervention. 97 Despite the fact that preferences are
being afforded to historically disadvantaged groups, when the bur-
den falls on a discrete, identifiable group, the issue of state-directed
capture of private entitlements is squarely posed. 98 It is, after all,
the "State [that] implements a race-based plan that requires such a
sharing of the burden." 99 In such circumstances, a constitutional
vision protecting individually held "moral rights against the
state"' 00 comes to the fore.' 0 '
The promotion cases lie along the continuum between the ex-
tremes of hiring and discharge cases and incorporate features of
each. In the promotional context the cost of granting a preference
cannot be diffused across a broad pool of applicants as in the hiring
context, nor can the identities of the preferred and dispreferred be
kept from each other; both will continue to work in the same enter-
prise, in some instances with the preferred in a direct supervisory
relationship to the dispreferred. Thus in the two major promotion
cases prior to Martin, the Court took pains to carefully examine the
expectation interests of the dispreferred to determine whether a
vested entitlement existed.'
02
97 Robin West, The Supreme Court-Foreword, Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 43, 52 (1990).
98 The status of the individual has been unclear throughout the development of
antidiscrimination law under both the Constitution and Title VII. While the animating
spirit of the case law is to provide relief to the historically disadvantaged groups in our
society, see Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978), the Court's opin-
ions are nonetheless replete with claims that under the antidiscrimination principle, the
"focus on the individual is unambiguous." Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Man-
hart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978); accord Furnco, 438 U.S. at 579-80; Connecticut v. Teal,
457 U.S. 440, 453-55 (1982). Cf Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) ("The rights
established [under the Fourteenth Amendment] are personal rights.").
99 IVygant, 476 U.S. at 281 n.8 (plurality opinion of Justice Powell).
100 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 147 (1977). The strong form of
this argument is found in ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 28-29 (1968), in
which the rights of individuals are upheld as positive moral constraints on the goal-
directed policies of society, whether these rights are justified on utilitarian or other
grounds.
101 According to Justice Powell,
All state-imposed classifications that rearrange burdens and benefits on
the basis of race are likely to be viewed with deep resentment by the indi-
viduals burdened .... These individuals are likely to find little comfort in
the notion that the deprivation they are asked to endure is... inspired by
the supposedly benign purpose of aiding others.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 294 n.34 (1978) (Powell, J.).
102 See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987) (finding that
dispreferred male employee had no firmly rooted expectation of promotion); United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (creation of new promotional opportu-
nity with preferences aimed at integrating previously segregated craft positions did not
trammel pre-existing interests of dispreferred white workers).
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Perhaps the most difficult case to date for the Court,Johnson v.
Transportation Agency,10 3 arose in the promotional context. Although
it involved sex rather than race discrimination, this case is instruc-
tive both because of its focus on the nature of the dispreferred's
expectational interests and because it weighed those interests in the
context of promotional opportunities, much like those at stake in
Martin. In Johnson, a male applicant for a promotion to a road dis-
patcher position claimed that the Transportation Agency promoted
a female applicant instead of him because of a county-assigned pref-
erence for women.'0 4 Johnson was deemed qualified for the posi-
tion and had scored marginally better than the female applicant,
Diana Joyce, on the promotional examination.10 5 While no woman
had ever served in the desired position, road crew dispatcher, the
record was bereft of any evidence of employer discrimination to-
ward women in promoting them to supervisory positions; indeed
Joyce was the first woman ever to hold the lower position of road
maintenance worker from which the promotion was sought. 06
Johnson squarely posed the question of a preference without a
putative history of discrimination, but in a singularly uncomfortable
setting. The identities of the preferred and dispreferred were
known, and the costs of the preference were fully localized on the
one dispreferred individual. Nonetheless, the Court- denied
Johnson's claim of discrimination, in large part on the basis of the
quality of Johnson's expectation. The Court examined the hiring
practices of Santa Clara County and found that, despite his high
score on the promotional examination, Johnson was only one of
seven individuals eligible for promotion, and the employer retained
discretion to promote any of the seven individuals. 10 7 Consequently
Johnson "had no absolute entitlement to the road dispatcher posi-
tion," and the denial accordingly "unsettled no legitimate, firmly
rooted expectation."' 08
The Supreme Court's affirmative action jurisprudence prior to
the 1988 Term can therefore be characterized as possessing a toler-
ant view of efforts to advantage historically disfavored groups.
When affirmative action imposed direct burdens on legitimate ex-
pectations held by identifiable, incumbent employees, the Court's
response was quite the contrary. Claims of incumbent employees
were not procedurally barred by the unilateral action of an employer
103 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
104 Id. at 623-26.
105 Id. at 623-24.
106 Id. at 623.




promulgating new regulations, as inJohnson,' 0 9 or even by an em-
ployer negotiating the terms of the affirmative action plan with a
union or with underrepresented minorities, both of which occurred
in Wygant. 110 Rather, localized costs imposed on the vested expecta-
tions of incumbent employees, particularly when the cost was loss of
employment, were impermissible well before the 1988 Term. In
sum, the pre-1988 affirmative action case law can be conceptualized
as follows:
TABLE 1
PRE-1988 AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PERMISSIBILITY
Preference Cost Bearer
Preference Recipient Individual White Group White
Individual Black Maybe"1  Yes 11
2
Group Black No t 3  Yes"
14
It would be mis.eading to overstate the continued stability of
the Supreme Court consensus on affirmative action remedies in the
employment setting. That consensus has suffered serious disrepair
in the past two terms of the Court, from surprisingly opposing
109 Id. at 619-20 (reviewing EEOC and district court jurisdiction to hear claim).
110 476 U.S. 267, 271-73 (1986) (reviewing procedural history).
111 The Court has not upheld the use of preferences when the preference given to a
specific black employee disrupts the settled expectation of an individual white employee,
absent an express finding of discrimination. Compare Firefighters Local Union No. 1784
v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (striking down of a consent decree-instituted preference
not based on court findings of discrimination) with United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S.
149 (1987), and Local 28 of the Sheetmetal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421
(1986) (both cases based upholding of use of preferences on judicial findings of
discrimination). When no settled expectation is involved, the Court has allowed for the
preferential treatment of one employee over another on the basis of race or sex. See
Johnson, 480 U.S. 616.
112 Arguably this box does not represent affirmative action at all but rather make-
whole relief aimed at restoring an individual to the position he or she would have
occupied but for the discrimination. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747,
770-72 (1976).
' '3 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986), exemplifies this situation:
the Court held that historic discrimination against blacks as a group could not overcome
the vested expectations of individual white employees.
114 The classic example continues to be United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193, 208 (1979). In the absence of any pre-existing expectation of advancement to
newly created craft positions, no individual white employee lost any secured right.
Therefore, the Court upheld an affirmative action plan which was presented as a group
preference for historically excluded blacks and as a plan which imposed the costs on
whites as a group.
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quarters. First, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,1 15 the Court
struck down a municipal ordinance setting aside thirty percent of
the city contracts for minority business enterprises.1 16 This marked
the first time that the Court had struck down a minority preference
that did not disrupt any pre-existing, entrenched expectations of
dispreferred groups or individuals since the Bakke" 7 case in 1978.
While the Court's ruling was no doubt heavily influenced by the
presence of a fixed quota at a relatively high level of opportunity,1 18
the Croson Court was nonetheless strikingly more categorical in its
denunciation of race-based classifications, regardless of their pur-
pose or motivation.119
Second, and directly to the contrary, the Supreme Court af-
firmed the use of minority preferences in granting broadcast
licenses in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC. 120 In reaffirming the
broader power of Congress to create racial remedies under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 121 the Court once again failed to
address the effects of preferences on the dispreferred. Instead, the
Court, taking a tack 180 degrees to the contrary of Croson, declared
that a relaxed standard of review should apply when congressional
preferences are "benign" in that they aid disadvantaged groups, re-
gardless of the use of racial classifications. 122
An unstable fegal regime that meets the description of" 'check-
erboard' justice" may indeed result from these past two terms of the
Court.123 But the question is whether Martin properly belongs to
the altered civil rights case law following the 1988 Term, 124 or
115 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
116 Id. at 498-506.
117 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
118 Croson, 488 U.S. at 488-89, 499, 505-06.
119 See id. at 493-95; id. at 520-21, 527-28 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
120 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
121 Id at 3008. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), established that courts
should defer to the congressional power to enact appropriate legislation under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment in order to remedy discrimination. In Fullilove, the Court
upheld 10% minority set-asides in federally awarded contracts and based its opinion on
a congressional finding that prior discrimination had impaired or foreclosed access by
minority business enterprises to public contact opportunities. See generally Drew S. Days,
III, Fullilove, 96 YALE LJ. 453, 474-76 (1987) (focusing on the congressional source of
mandated set-asides as the key to the Court's ruling).
122 Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3008-09.
123 Charles Fried, The Supreme Court-Comment, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC:
Two Concepts of Equality, 104 HARv. L. REv. 107, 117 (1990) (quoting RONALD DWORKIN,
LAw's EMPIRE 184 (1986)).
124 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword- The Vanishing
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REv. 43, 51-56 (1989). For contrasting views of how the pre-
1988 jurisprudence differed from the Court's approach during the 1988 Term, compare
West, supra note 97, at 53 (finding Court to have departed from "the substantive and
jurisprudential implications of liberal legalism" in a decisively conservative direction),
with Fried, supra note 123, at 110 (arguing that the Court abandoned liberal individual-
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whether it fits into the more coherent scheme that governed reme-
dial classifications through the earlier part of the 1980s. Can Martin
be reconciled with a vision of civil rights that allows for
nonmalevolent uses of racial or sexual classifications so long as the
costs to the dispreferred are diffused across a broad pool and no
individual is made to suffer unduly? If so, then the Supreme Court's
decision in that case does not mark the radical departure from prior
law that its critics have claimed. To examine Martin in this light re-
quires that we turn our attention to the interests of the dispreferred
white firefighters and the costs imposed upon them.
C. Property Rights and Procedural Due Process
As Professor Randall Kennedy reminds us, the moral justifica-
tion for affirmative action must be that affirmative action is a form of
"social justice" given "as rather modest compensation for the long
period of racial subordination suffered by blacks as a group. "125
This remedial objective, broadly conceived, is the moral foundation
for granting racial preferences 12 6 in the face of claims of "affirmative
discrimination" or "reverse discrimination."' 127 However, even if
the argument in favor of affirmative action were accepted uncriti-
cally, a crucial question would remain concerning how to distribute
the social cost of granting such preferences. Clearly, in the absence
of an across-the-board expansion of opportunity for all, preferences
ism in Metro Broadcasting in favor of a "collectivist, group-rights conception of equal pro-
tection"). Needless to add, both Professors West and Fried were commenting on the
same Term of the Supreme Court.
125 Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate,
99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1332 (1986). For discussions of group-based theories of rights
favoring affirmative action, see Robert Belton, Discrimination and Affirmative Action: An
Analysis of Competing Theories of Equality and Weber, 59 N.C. L. REV. 531 (1981); Alfred W.
Blumrosen, The Group Interest Concept, Employment Discrimination and Legislative Intent. The
Fallacy of Connecticut v. Teal, 20 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 99 (1983); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and
the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976).
126 A bountiful literature was sparked by the debate over affirmative action, even a
summary of which would be beyond the scope of this Article. For useful recent contri-
butions, see, e.g., HERMAN BELZ, EQUALITY TRANSFORMED (1991) (attacking Supreme
Court jurisprudence for move from protection of individual opportunity to institution of
group-based preferences); MICHEL ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND JUSTICE 283-
336 (1991) (reviewing philosophical and jurisprudential literature on affirmative action
and proposing a defense of affirmative action based on "justice as reversible reciproc-
ity"); LEE SIGELMAN & SUSAN WELCH, BLACK AMERICANS' VIEWS OF RACIAL INEQUALITY
119-45 (1991) (compiling survey data broken down by race of respondent on attitudes
toward remedies for racial discrimination); THOMAS SOWELL, PREFERENTIAL POLITICS
(1990) (providing examples of failures of preferential policies in heterogeneous socie-
ties around the world); PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY 131-45 (1990) (describ-
ing the philosophical inability to establish non-normative first principles of equality).
127 The term "affirmative discrimination" is drawn from NATHAN GLAZER, AFFIRMA-
rIVE DISCRIMINATION- ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY (1975).
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for one group impose costs that groups or individuals outside the
preferred classification will have to absorb.
Cost allocation concerns have raised independent issues of so-
cial justice in treating the dispreferred,1 28 particularly when the
costs are localized on an identifiable individual or group. In re-
ponse some commentators have called for a system of compensation
for the "victims of preferential employment discrimination reme-
dies." 1 29 While these approaches are consistent with the broad
theme of this Article, they nonetheless address the problem from a
different vantage point. A more careful examination of the rights
implicated by a case such as Martin reveals that tenured, career-term
public employees already have a legal basis for protection from the
adverse impact of employer agreements to resolve workforce
imbalances.
In a series of cases involving the job tenure of public employees
dating from the 1960s, the Supreme Court has attempted to clarify
the conditions under which state employers may compromise the
employment expectations of their employees. In Board of Regents v.
Roth,' 30 a challenge to the nonretention of an untenured professor
at a Wisconsin state university, the Court formally supplanted the
view that state employment was a privilege that conferred no sub-
stantive rights or entitlements to the jobholders.13 1 In its place the
128 See Fallon & Weiler, supra note 7, at 28-45.
129 J. Hoult Verkerke, Note, Compensating Victims of Preferential Employment Discrimina-
tion Remedies, 98 YALE L.J. 1479 (1989) (advocating a theory of systematic compensation
for the dispreferred under Title VII). See also Iris A. Burke & Oscar G. Chase, Resolving
the Seniority/Minority Layoffs Conflict: An Employer Targeted Approach, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 81, 83 (1978) (advocating "full payroll" remedy to shift impact of dispreferred
onto employer wrongdoer). Cf Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S.
561, 605-06 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (advocating treating employer as having
entered two binding contracts: one to desegregate and one to respect seniority); W.R.
Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757,
767 (1983) (company desiring to reduce workforce, constrained by both collective bar-
gaining agreement and Title VII consent decree, faces dilemma "of the Company's own
making. The Company committed itself voluntarily to two conflicting contractual obli-
gations").
In a unique case subsequently vacated in light of Stotts, a district court ordered the
State of NewJersey to pay compensation to incumbent whites for employment opportu-
nities lost as a result of affirmative action; the court reasoned that this would be the only
fair solution because the cost of remedial affirmative action is properly chargeable to
society as a whole. Vulcan Pioneers v. NewJersey Dep't of Civil Serv., 588 F. Supp. 716,
vacated, 588 F. Supp. 732 (D.NJ. 1984), aff'd, 770 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1985).
130 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
131 Id. at 571. The courts had long held that public employment was a "privilege,"
not a "right," and accordingly that public employees faced with adverse employment
decisions were not owed any due process protections. See Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d
46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). The Court
expressly repudiated this doctrine five years before Roth: "IT]he theory that public em-
ployment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regard-
less of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected." Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
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Court found an affirmative right to continued employment-a right
characterized as a property interestI 32-when there is "a legitimate
claim of entitlement" based on "more than a unilateral expectation"
of the jobholder. 33
The Court in Roth focused on the terms under which the state
had offered employment in order to define the "interests encom-
passed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and
property."'' 3 4 In order for employment expectations to rise to the
level of a cognizable property interest, the Court found, there must
be a clear creation of entitlement under the governing state regula-
tions: "Just as the welfare recipients' 'property' interest in welfare
payments was created and defined by statutory terms, so [Roth's]
'property' interest in employment at Wisconsin State University-
Oshkosh was created and defined by the terms of his appoint-
ment." 35 After Roth, the Court looked to whether the employer
had implemented a formal or informal tenure policy that created
cognizable legal expectations in continued employment.
Equally significant, for purposes of this Article, are the ap-
proaches that the Court considered and rejected in Roth. The
strong dissents of Justices Douglas and Marshall invited the Court
to extend due process protection to all state employees. They
would deny the power of the state to create or withhold property
rights. For Justices Douglas and Marshall, the power of state em-
ployers either to chill the speech of their employees 3 6 or to imper-
missibly discriminate among them 3 7 rendered the exclusive
conferral of due process protection to tenured employees insuffi-
cient, if not downright arbitrary. This is most clearly expressed in
Justice Marshall's view that "every citizen who applies for a govern-
ment job is entitled to it unless the government can establish some
reason for denying the employment. This is the 'property' right that
I believe is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and that can-
not be denied 'without due process of law.' "138
385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (discussing
demise of rights-privileges jurisprudence); Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Adminis-
trative State, 72 CAL. L. REv. 1044, 1047-65 (1984) (describing emergence and fall of
rights-privileges distinction).
132 See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (applying real
property analogy to state entitlement programs upon which individuals rely for suste-
nance); Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 263 (granting full due process protection to property inter-
ests created by state entitlement programs in the context of welfare benefits).
133 Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
134 Id. at 569.
135 Id. at 578. The Court's reliance on welfare-based property rights is based on the
line of due process cases commencing with Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254.
136 Id. at 585 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
137 Id. at 587-89 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
1-38 Id. at 588 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The Court rejected -the freedom of speech and equal protection
approaches ofJustices Douglas and Marshall. Instead the Court bi-
furcated the constitutional inquiry, asking first whether the state had
created an entitlement to continued employment by, for example,
providing for discharge only for certain enumerated reasons. The
state's creation of an entitlement of this nature gives rise to a prop-
erty interest that triggers the protections of due process. Having
found a state-created property interest, the second question con-
cerned the actual process due under the Due Process Clause. After
a decade of meandering on the precise contours of property-based
due process in employment, 139 the Court in Cleveland Board of
Education v. Loudermill'40 finally arrived at a consensus view of the
procedural protections owing to the newly recognized property
rights in state employment. The Court in Loudermill defined in-
dependent procedural rights for all public employees who met the
Roth standard of vested employment rights.14 1 In the context of ter-
mination of vested employment, the Court identified three compet-
ing factors that must govern the due process inquiry: "the severity
of depriving a person of the means of livelihood";1 42 "the govern-
mental interest in the expeditious removal of unsatisfactory employ-
139 See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341
(1976). In Arnett, a deeply divided Court held that a nonevidentiary, nontrial-type
predeprivation hearing was constitutionally sufficient despite the fact that the
pretermination hearing would, under the facts of the case, be held before the same per-
son who was the subject of the employee's critical speech that gave rise to the discharge.
The plurality opinion by Justice Rehnquist asserts that property rights created by statute
warrant procedural protection only to the extent prescribed by the statute itself, so that
employees "must take the bitter with the sweet." Arnett, 416 U.S. at 154. In Bishop, the
Court found no property interest in continued employment under the facts of the case
but explicitly rejected Justice Rehnquist's "bitter with the sweet" approach to assessing
the extent of procedural protection owing to statutorily conferred property rights.
Bishop, 426 U.S. at 345 n.8.
Academic commentators were as divided as the Court on whether constitutional
due process requirements could exist independent of the state law entitlements that
created the underlying rights. The most direct support for the "bitter with the sweet"
rationale is found in Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. CT. REV.
85. See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrITONAL LAW § 10-12, at 706-14 (2d
ed. 1988) (having reservation about independent procedural requirements but seeking
protection for individuals' perceptions of self-worth); William Van Alstyne, Cracks in
"The New Property". Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV.
445, 462-65 (1977) (viewing power to create procedural requirements as flowing from
power to create substantive entitlements, but arguing for the virtue of being treated
fairly as an independent good). For defenses of constitutional procedural protections,
see Douglas Laycock, Due Process and Separation of Powers: The Effort to Make the Due Process
Clauses Nonjusticiable, 60 TEx. L. REv. 875, 882-95 (1982) (responding to Easterbrook);
Peter N. Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court: A Defense of Roth and Perry, 71
CAL. L. REV. 146 (1983).
140 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
141 Id. at 539-42.
142 Id. at 543.
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ees and the avoidance of administrative burdens";1 43 and "the risk
of erroneous termination."'1
44
Balancing these factors, the Court identified "notice and an op-
portunity to respond"' 45 as the essential features of due process.
Accordingly, public employers were obliged to provide individual
notice of proposed adverse action and the basis therefore to their
tenured employees, and to provide them an opportunity to contest
the adverse action, either personally or in writing, prior to its
execution. 1
46
The Court was fully aware that it was sanctioning the depriva-
tion of a property interest with "something less" than a full eviden-
tiary hearing.' 47 In deference to the interest of governmental
employers in expeditious action, the pretermination right afforded
under Loudermill did not grant the affected employee the right to
"test the strength of the evidence 'by confronting and cross-examin-
ing adverse witnesses and by presenting witnesses on [the em-
ployee's] own behalf ... 1 ",148 Thus, the Court insisted that part of
the due process protection consisted of the guarantee that under
state law a full postdeprivation hearing would be held in which the
employee could defend her entitlement with undiminished legal
rights. 149
IV
THE INDEPENDENT COMMANDS OF DUE PROCESS
In examining the issues in Martin under a property-based due
process inquiry, three questions arise. The first is whether the con-
cept of a protectable property interest can extend beyond the
discharge context to incorporate lesser adverse impacts on employ-
ment, such as the denial of a promotion. If so, the next question
concerns the adequacy of the procedural protections afforded such a
property interest. Does the opportunity of affected third parties to
raise objections at a fairness hearing under Rule 23(e) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure satisfy their due process rights? Put differ-
ently, are the due process commands of notice and an adequate
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 546.
146 Id. See also HenryJ. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1281
(1975) (setting forthr due process requirement of opportunity to respond prior to ad-
verse governmental action).
147 Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343
(1976)).
148 Id. at 548 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 214 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
149 Id. at 546.
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hearing as articulated by the Court in Loudermill satisfied when third
parties are given the opportunity to raise objections to a consent
decree to which they were not a party? Finally, our inquiry must
turn to the scope of the rights for which the due process protections
are claimed. Clearly, in the context of a systematic pattern of denial
of employment opportunity to minorities, the whites who as a group
benefitted from the expansion ofjob opportunities at the expense of
minorities cannot claim an inviolate right to a continued monopoly
on employment opportunities.
A. Vested Expectations in Promotional Opportunities
The tragedy of the Birmingham litigation is that a noble strug-
gle to rid the City of invidious discrimination has evolved into an
irreconcilable confrontation between legitimate aspirations. On the
one hand are the black citizens of Birmingham, iong denied the ba-
sic human claim to self-esteem ' 50 by segregation of opportunity,
and denied the more specific capacity to achieve self-respect
through work.' 51 The absence of prospects for advancement that
defined black life in Birmingham, a "kind of moral exile from soci-
ety,"'152 cried out for redress. The courts became the locus of a wor-
thy crusade to open the avenues of integration and self-realization
through employment opportunity.153
Unfortunately for blacks aspiring to equal employment oppor-
tunities, the period in which the legal prohibitions against formal
discrimination finally met legal condemnation was one of decreased
economic opportunity and increased unemployment.15 4 In particu-
lar, a contraction of employment in manufacturing and municipal
service closed to blacks a preferred path of integration that had
150 See WORK IN AMERICA, REPORT OF A SPECIAL TASK FORCE TO THE SECRETARY OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELARE 3-7 (1973) (describing employment as key source of
self-esteem), reprinted in PAUL W. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOY-
MENT LAW 4-6 (1987); JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 440 (1976) (describing the
desire for achievement of self-esteem as one of the principal tenets which persons in the
Rawlsian original position would agree is the basis for structuring society).
151 J. Donald Moon, The Moral Basis of the Democratic Welfare State, in DEMOCRACY AND
THE WELFARE STATE 47 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1987).
152 Id. at 41.
153 See Jon Elster, Is There (or Should There Be) a Right To Work?, in DEMOCRACY AND
THE WELFARE STATE, supra note 151, at 53, 74-76 (reporting Western European workers'
preference for payment of capital subsidies to industry in order to create jobs over wage
or income subsidies directed to unemployed employees).
154 See MichaelJ. Piore, Historical Perspectives and the Interpretation of Unemployment, 25J.
ECON. Lrr. 1834, 1834 (1987) (unemployment rates from the 1970s to the 1980s are
persistently three to four times those prevailing in the 1960s through the 1970s).
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been exploited by previous generations of immigrants as a stepping
stone to collective advancement. 55
At the same time, the white incumbents in Birmingham were
acquiring vested rights in their employment. Under a seniority sys-
tem established by civil service regulations, incumbent employees
acquired increased job protections, promotional eligibility, wages,
and benefits with each passing year.1 56 These employment rights
that were grounded in the continued service of incumbent employ-
ees existed independent of any discrimination or antidiscrimination
claim. Moreover, although not recognized as a matter of formal
constitutional law, the reliance interests of the individual firefighters
in their ongoing employment steadily increased with the passage of
time. ' 57
Recognition of such seniority-based expectations, whether for-
malized by collective bargaining agreements or civil service regula-
tions, represents an effort to protect an aging generation,
particularly after individual competitive primes have passed, from
competitive pressures of younger employees. Accordingly, econo-
mists treat seniority systems as "a redistribution from young to old,
maintained as an equilibrium to effect the smoothing of intertem-
poral consumption."'' 5 8 For long-term individual employees under
155 The Irish ... still offer the clearest example of the intergenerational dy-
namics at work within the immigrant-ethnic working class. During the
Famine immigration, the Irish tended to cluster in the commercial-manu-
facturing ports and factory towns and occupied the bottom of the occupa-
tional scale, in domestic service, day labor, and the most debased,
sweated branches of manufacturing and the building trades. A less spec-
tacular but still formidable Irish migration replenished the ranks of do-
mestic servant girls and laborers in the 1860s and 1870s. At the same
time, however, a significant portion of the Irish-American working class,
especially of the second-generation "natives," began moving incre-
mentally into skilled and semiskilled positions (iron molding, steamfit-
ting, masonry) as well as into petty retailing. From their ranks would
come politicians, editors, trade unionists, and informal community lead-
ers ....
Sean Wilentz, The Rise of the American Working Class, in PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN LABOR
HISTORY: THE PROBLEMS OF SYNrHESIS 83, 119 (J. Caroll Moody & Alice Kessler-Harris
eds., 1989). See also THOMAS SOWELL, RACE AND ECONOMICS 59-156 (1975).
156 In Birmingham, for example, white employees who were next in line for promo-
tions to fire department lieutenant positions filed the reverse discrimination charges.
They claimed that they had settled entitlements to the next promotional positions pur-
suant to the existing state regulations but that the Fire Department's compliance with
the consent decrees caused them to lose these promotions. See supra note 33 (discussing
state law basis of firefighters' expectation interests).
157 See Samuel Issacharoff, Reconstructing Employment, 104 HARV. L. REV. 607, 621-24
(1990) (book review) (discussing reliance-based interests of incumbent employees in
their employment and the difficulty senior employees have in replacing job status in
open market).
158 Kenneth Schepsle & Barry Nalebuff, The Commitment to Seniority in Self-Governing
Groups, 6J.L. ECON. & ORG. 45, 48 (footnote omitted) (1990) (surveying economic litera-
ture on role and development of seniority-based preferences).
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a seniority system, loss of seniority-based expectations not only rep-
resents a defeat of anticipated economic protections but may im-
pose independent "demoralization costs" from the loss of what was
thought to be a secure entitlement. 159 In the union setting, senior-
ity is afforded tremendous legal protection because of a recognition
that" '[m]ore than any other provision of the collective[-bargaining]
agreement ... seniority affects the economic security of the individ-
ual employee covered by its terms.' "160
It is therefore not surprising that job expectations based on
seniority are perceived to be the most critical of employment
rights. 161 Nor is it surprising that employment expectations trig-
gered by seniority rights occupy a uniquely protected niche in both
labor law and employment discrimination law, as evidenced by the
special protections afforded bona fide seniority systems under
Title VII.16 2
Thus, when the City of Birmingham revised its promotional
processes without any form of compensation or other adjustment to
incumbent firefighters, the incumbents properly perceived this as a
loss, particularly for the individual firefighters who claimed they
would have secured promotions but for the consent decrees. The
perception of loss does not in itself trigger a property interest pro-
tectable by the Due Process Clause. Rather, claims of entitlement in
employment must, in the language of Roth, be based on "more than
a unilateral expectation" of entitlement to the employment bene-
fit. 16 3 Nonetheless, at least as alleged in the complaints con-
solidated before the Eleventh Circuit, 164 the individual white
firefighters claimed "more than a unilateral expectation" that pro-
159 JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 122 (1985).
160 Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 766 (1976) (quoting Benjamin
Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 HARV. L. REV.
1532, 1535 (1962)).
161 See RICHARD B. FREEDMAN &JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 123 (1984)
(seniority rights are critical component of unionized workforces; most American produc-
tion workers covered by seniority projections).
162 See Section 703(h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2002(h) (1988), which pro-
vides that "[i]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply
different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system ...." See also Brotherhood
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 350-54 (1977) (reviewing special protec-
tions of seniority expectations in Title VII legislative history).
163 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
164 See Complaint for Wilks, Wilks v. Arrington, No. CV 83-AR-2116-S (N.D. Ala.
1983), reprinted in IJoNT APPENDIX at 130, 131-33, Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989)
(No. 87-1614) (alleging that plaintiffs were among top-ranked candidates from prior ad-
ministration of promotional examination and that the City had failed to issue promo-
tions in conformity with the governing Civil Service Act); In re Birmingham Reverse
Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492 (11 th Cir. 1987), affd sub nom. Martin
v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
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motions would be granted to them based on their seniority and per-
formance on promotional examinations.
Employee discharge cases present the clearest findings of
property-based rights to employment.165 When an employee stands
to lose employment altogether, the issue of the existence of a legal
entitlement is most directly drawn, and, in light of the magnitude of
the loss, 1 6 6 the employee is most likely to pursue avenues of legal
redress. Despite the prevalence of discharge cases, it would be a
mistake to narrow the legal protections of employment to the ques-
tion of having a job alone. Rather, the case law supports a broader
conception of legally protected entitlements that- encompasses a
broad swath of terms and conditions of employment to which an
employee may lay contractual or statutory claim.
The concept of property in the due process case law is ex-
tremely flexible. Property interests have been found not only for
formally tenured employees, but also for the employee who ex-
pected continued employment because of "custom or policy" rather
than formal regulation. In Perry v. Sindermann,167 one of the
landmark Supreme Court cases on property rights of public employ-
ees, the Court held that an untenured professor at a state college
which lacked a formal tenure policy could nonetheless claim an
abridgment of property rights based on a "feel[ing] that he ha[d]
permanent tenure as long as his teaching services [were] satisfac-
tory."168 Similarly, courts have found that untenured, even pro-
bationary, employees who were given assurances of continued
employment absent performance failures could claim a breach of
due process-protected property rights. 169
Courts have also applied the Loudermill due process analysis to
protect against loss of employment opportunity or income that may
result from claimed arbitrary discipline, suspension, or censure. 170
165 See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
166 Labor arbitrators routinely refer to discharges as the "capital punishment" of the
employment setting. Foster v. Bowman Transp. Co., 562 F. Supp. 806, 817 (N.D. Ala.
1983).
167 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
168 Id. at 600. See also Colburn v. Trustees of Indiana Univ., 739 F. Supp. 1268 (S.D.
Ind. 1990) (holding that property rights in promotions under Loudermill can be created
either by state statute or regulations that substantively limit decision-makers' discretion
or by customs or policies that create "mutually explicit understandings" about promo-
tion entitlements and criteria).
169 See, e.g., Perri v. Aytch, 724 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1983) (probationer dischargeable
only for cause had protectable property interest); Marvin v. King, 734 F. Supp. 346 (S.D.
Ind. 1990) (probationary firefighter dischargeable only for unsatisfactory performance
had property interest); Lewis v. Hayes, 505 N.E.2d 408 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (probationer
dischargeable only for incompetence or disqualification has property interest).
170 See, e.g., Newman v. Massachusetts, 884 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1989) (professor disci-
plined for alleged plagiarism has due process procedural rights), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
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Similarly, courts have found protectable property interests in claims
of tenure in a particular position,1 71 in accrued benefits,172 and in
access to workers' compensation benefits.1 73
Although less robust than the case law involving discharge and
complete loss of benefits, the courts have assigned property rights
to employees seeking a promotion in numerous circumstances
"where a promotion would be virtually a matter of right-for exam-
ple, where it was solely a function of seniority or tied to other objec-
tive criteria."' 74 The Eighth Circuit applied property analysis to
seniority-based promotions in finding that government employees
had a property interest in a detailed promotion system:
[A]bsent statutes, regulations, or some other basis for such a legit-
imate claim of entitlement, government employment and promo-
1078 (1990); Narunanchi v. Board of Trustees, 850 F.2d 70 k2d Cir. 1988) (suspension
of professor requires due process); Doe v. Bowen, 682 F. S-pp. 637 (D. Mass. 1987)
(hospital must provide due process to physician threatened with suspension for alleged
Medicare and Medicaid fraud); Garraghty v.Jordan, 830 F.2d 1295 (4th Cir. 1987) (sus-
pension of prison warden requires due process). But see Gillard v. Norris, 857 F.2d 1095
(6th Cir. 1988) (three-day suspension is de minimis harm not implicating due process);
Angell v. Leslie, 832 F.2d 817, 832 n.6 (4th Cir. 1987) (property right implicated by one-
day suspension is probably de minimis and not deserving of due process protection).
171 See, e.g., Collins v. Marina-Martinez, 894 F.2d 474 (1st Cir. 1990) (property inter-
est violated when professor removed from tenured position to untenured position, de-
spite no discharge); Rathjen v. Litchfield, 878 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1969) (demoted
employee has property interest in her former position but must exhaust administrative
remedies prior to federal suit). But see Sewell v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 863 F.2d
461 (6th Cir. 1988) (harm caused by wrongful demotion de minimis because reinstate-
ment to prior position with backpay occurred prior to litigation), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
820 (1989);Jimenez-Torres de Panepinto v. Saldana, 834 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1987) (find-
ing no property right in library director position even though property right exists in job
within less advanced library classification); Baden v. Koch, 799 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1986)
(no property interest in appointed Chief Medical Examiner position).
172 See, e.g., Knudson v. City of Ellensburg, 832 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1987) (police
officer has vested property interest in disability medical benefits despite postretirement
narcotics felony conviction); Germano v. City of Mayfield Heights, 648 F. Supp. 984
(N.D. Ohio 1986) (property interest of police officer in accrued sick leave and clothing
allowance; because of small amounts at stake, court held plaintiff should pursue state
court remedies), aft'd, 833 F.2d 1012 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Jones & Laughlin Hourly
Pension Plan v. LTV Corp., 824 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 1987) (in private sector, finding
that "[w]e and other courts have suggested that pension plan members have a cogniza-
ble interest in receiving their contractually defined benefits"). But see Ramsey v. Board
of Educ., 844 F.2d 1268, 1274-75 (6th Cir. 1988): despite a property interest in accrued
sick leave,
an interference with a property interest in a pure benefit of employment,
as opposed to an interest in the tenured nature of the employment itself,
is an interest that can be and should be redressed by a state breach of
contract action and not by a federal action under section 1983.
173 See Cholewin v. City of Evanston, 899 F.2d 687 (7th Cir. 1990) (City's revocation
of "injured-on-duty" benefits to police officer implicates property interest protected by
due process).
174 Schwartz v. Thompson, 497 F.2d 430,433 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding no such prop-
erty right under facts presented).
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tion decisions are normally not subject to procedural due-process
protections .... Here, however, extensive OPM [Office of Per-
sonnel Management], Army and ALMSA [Automated Logistics
Management Systems Activity] regulations ... were in effect [and]
S.. provided the plaintiffs with a substantial, legitimate expecta-
tion by establishing that applications for competitive placement
... were to be evaluated in accord with specified criteria and pro-
cedures .... We therefore hold that the plaintiffs had a property
interest in ALMSA's merit-promotion system. ... 175
A similar result obtained in a case involving Alabama firefighters
working under a civil service statute that said positions "shall be
filled ... by promotion following competitive tests,' 76 a provision
applicable under the same substantive state law entitlement as in
Martin. When that procedure was unilaterally abrogated by a fire
chief seeking to promote personal favorites, the court held, "[t]he
probability that one of the class [of nonpromoted employees] would
have been promoted if proper procedures were followed is substan-
tial and protectable and thereby rises out of the realm of unilateral
expectancy and into that of property right."
1 77
That the property-based analysis of the employment termina-
tion cases can be applied to the promotional setting is not surpris-
ing. An examination of the mechanism for administering reductions
in force in the civil service context--or, for that matter, the union-
ized private sector-reveals that the distinction between promotion
and termination is one of degree, not of kind. At stake in either
promotion or layoff cases is the position that an incumbent em-
ployee should hold on the seniority roster, since it is that position
which will determine either promotional eligibility or the inverse
order of layoffs.
The Supreme Court's affirmative action cases provide an illus-
tration. In neither Firefighters Local Union No.' 1784 v. Stotts 178 nor
175 McIntosh v. Weinberger, 810 F.2d 1411, 1433-34 (8th Cir. 1987), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Turner v. McIntosh, 487 U.S. 1212 (1988).
176 International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 2069 v. City of Sylacauga, 436 F. Supp.
482, 487 (N.D. Ala. 1977) (quoting Rule 8A of the Civil Service Board of Sylacauga).
177 id. at 490. See also Chopp v. Independent .Sch. Dist. 706, Nos. C7-90-2068, C8-
90-1351, 1991 WL 10213 (Minn. App. Feb. 5, 1991) (finding teacher had legitimate
claim of entitlement to seniority rights which is a protectable property interest); Martin
v. Itasca County, 448 N.W.2d 368 (Minn. 1989) (loss of seniority accrual implicates
property right protected by due process); City of Riviera Beach v. Fitzgerald, 492 So.2d
1382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (loss of seniority-based promotion to which police officer
had reasonable expectation is deprivation of property interest). But see Koscherak v.
Schmeller, 363 F. Supp. 932, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (distinguishing deprivation of promo-
tion from discharge and holding only discharge actionable under due process on
grounds that "[p]laintiffs are not being deprived of something they now enjoy"), aff'd,
415 U.S. 943 (1974).
178 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
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Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,179 for example, did the dis-
preferred white employees claim that they were immune from lay-
offs. Rather, they sought to protect themselves against future or
threatened loss of work by securing rights inuring to their relative
positions on the seniority roster. In Stotts, the Court focused on the
dispreferred employees' loss of a place on the seniority roster in the
face of a reduction in force. The Court did not distinguish that loss
as either a bump-down demotion or a layoff that depended on the
relative seniority of the affected employee, because the employee's
position on the seniority roster controlled the adverse effect in
either instance.180 Moreover, the recall of the affected employees
did not moot the case because the layoff period affected the employ-
ees' accumulation of seniority credit. So great is the importance
given to seniority ranking that the Stotts Court enforced the senior-
ity-based claims of white dispreferred firefighters who were hired on
the same day as the preferred blacks; the claimed deprivation
amounted to losing the preference against layoffs because the white
employees' names were higher in alphabetical order than those of
the same-date-of-hire black employees. 8 1
The due process case law is moving beyond the discharge con-
text to encompass all significant terms and conditions of employ-
ment in which there is "more than a unilateral expectation" of
tenured entitlement. This trend has an analogue in a distinct realm
of constitutional employment law that does not depend on
property-based rights: the expansion of First Amendment protec-
tions of public employees. Beginning with Elrod v. Burns,'8 2 the
Court extended constitutional protection to public employees who
were threatened with patronage-based dismissal-discharge for rea-
sons of partisan political affiliation or nonaffiliation. Rather than
draw a sharp line to distinguish discharge from other untoward ef-
fects on employment, however, the Court proceeded to take the ra-
tionale of Elrod and expand it to all phases of the employment
relationship in which employers could threaten employee rights for
impermissible partisan purposes. Thus, in Rutan v. Republican Party
of Illinois,183 the Court expressly rejected the Seventh Circuit's deci-
sion that only actions that are the "substantial equivalent of a dis-
missal"' 8 4  could implicate constitutionally protected rights.
Instead, the Court extended Elrod to apply to all facets of the em-
179 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
180 Stotts, 467 U.S. at 571.
181 Fallon & Weiler, supra note 7, at 5.
182 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
183 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990).
184 868 F.2d 943, 955 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 110 S.
Ct. 2729 (1990).
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ployment relationship, including "promotions, transfers, and recalls
after layoffs"; 18 5 this extension is similar to the extended application
of the Roth-Loudermill due process analysis beyond the discharge sit-
uation. The Court thereby recognized that public employees could
have protectable employment rights not only in continued employ-
ment, but in various incidents of the employment relationship. That
recognition parallels the extension of due process protections to the
broad spectrum of well-founded employee expectations related to
the terms and conditions of public employment.
B. Procedural Due Process
Because of the exclusive focus on the reverse discrimination
claim, no court in the extensive litigation leading up to Martin made
any dispositive findings of fact concerning the expectational inter-
ests of the white firefighters in the promotions affected by the con-
sent decrees. While the promotional system in Birmingham did not
have a collective bargaining base,18 6 were the incumbents able to
show, as alleged in their complaints, reliance on a well-established
promotional system under which they would have had a reasonable
expectation of the next promotions, that should have sufficed to es-
tablish property interests protected by procedural due process. The
difference between the facts in Martin and Johnson is that, in the lat-
ter case, Paul Johnson was afforded full hearing rights to determine
the validity of his claim to the promotion given to DianaJoyce.18 7 In
the Birmingham case, however, the district court's reliance on the
collateral attack rule would have denied the affected white firefight-
ers any judicial review of their claimed expectations, other than ob-
jections raised during the approval of the consent decrees.
If the claims of incumbents to property interests in the terms
and conditions of their employment are accepted, the next step in
the inquiry is to define the proper procedural protections owed to
those claiming abridgment of these property interests. The primary
requirements of due process are notice and the opportunity to be
heard. Notice has traditionally been characterized, under the
Court's formulation in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,188
as satisfying due process if it is "reasonably calculated, under all the
185 Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2737.
186 See United States v.Jefferson County, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1834 (N.D.
Ala. 1981) (contrasting Alabama prohibitions on public sector collective bargaining
agreements with United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981), which
refused to approve consent decree altering collectively bargained rights without ap-
proval of unions).
187 Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (discussed supra text ac-
companying notes 103-09).
188 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objec-
tions." 1s9 The reaction to Martin, both in the academic literature
and in the legislative debates concerning the Civil Rights Act of
1990, has focused overwhelmingly on the notice issue under Mullane
as the critical constitutional inquiry. The legislative history reveals
that proponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1990 believed that the
sole constitutional constraint was the notice required by Mullane and
its progeny.190
Mullane guides the due process inquiry only so long as no at-
tempt is made to distinguish between the types of interests affected
by consent decrees. If we focus on the impact of consent decrees on
the rights of vested incumbents, two separate problems emerge
more dearly. First, the Mullane balance of hardships in providing
individual notice disappears, since the vested incumbents are readily
identifiable from the employment rolls of one o . the parties to the
litigation-the employer. When the affected individuals are readily
identifiable, actual notice served personally on the affected individu-
als is required.19' Under such circumstances, newspaper publica-
tion of vaguely worded legal announcements, as was done in Martin,
is inexcusable. 192 Directly worded notice could easily be provided
through employee paychecks or by letters mailed to the home ad-
189 Id. at 314.
190 See House Comm. ON EDuc. AND LABOR, REPORT OF COMMiTrEE ON EDUCATION
MD LABOR, H.R. REP. No. 644, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 69 (1990) ("In Mullane,
the Court specifically recognized that due process may be satisfied so long as reasonable
efforts are made to give notice to interested persons."). See also Hearings, supra note 23,
at 546 (testimony of Prof. Laurence H. Tribe) (due process requirements defined by
Mullane); George M. Strickler, Martin v. Wilks, 64 TULANE L. Rnv. 1557, 1576-81 (1990)
(focusing on Mullane to define constitutional due process issues in Martin). The focus on
Mullane originated with Professor Larry Kramer, a defender of the Cleveland Firefighters
decision and of the constitutionality of the collateral attack rule if sufficient procedural
protections are incorporated into its use. See Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights
of Third Parties, 87 MICH. L. REv. 321, 345-49 (1988).
The defeated Civil Rights Act of 1990, therefore, would have forbidden collateral
attacks on consent decrees when reasonable efforts were made to provide notice to third
parties prior to the entry of the decree. H.R. 4000, S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 2(a)(1) (1990). The 1991 Act rejected this approach in favor of an actual notice stan-
dard. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 108, § 703(n)(B)(i)(I) (1991).
191 See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798-800 (1983) (requir-
ing more than publication notice when affected individuals could be identified through
"reasonably diligent efforts").
192 In Martin, the notice consisted of ads in local newspapers stating that "Consent
Decrees ... designed to correct for the effects of any alleged past discrimination and to
insure equal employment opportunities for all applicants and employees" were to be
entered. Petitioner's Application at 174a, Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (No. 87-
1614).
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dresses maintained by the employer.1 93 Even under Mullane, there-
fore, there is no reason for anything less than individual notice for
tenured employees.
Nevertheless, the focus on notice obscures the fact that the crit-
ical due process issue is not so much the form of the notice, but its
substance. Notice provides the means by which the party notified
can take advantage of the required opportunity to be heard, and it is
precisely on the question of the type of hearing afforded that the
pre-Martin collateral attack doctrine falls short.
The opportunity to be heard must be commensurate to the
rights at stake.' 94 As developed in the preceding discussion of the
due process case law culminating in Loudermill, property interests in
vested employment benefits are considered even more weighty than
such fundamental government entitlements as social security and
are afforded a strong dose of procedural due process. 195
An examination of the critical cases applying due process rights
to vested employees reveals that although less than full adversarial
hearings are permitted prior to the decision to deprive an employee
of job rights, courts have granted that permission only for tempo-
rary deprivations (e.g., suspension from the workforce). To satisfy
due process, however, a temporary deprivation must be followed by
a full adversarial hearing at which the burden of proof rests with the
employer, and at which the employee has the right to conduct dis-
covery and cross-examine witnesses.
The issue in the highly disputed pre-Loudermill case law turns on
what constitutes a sufficient opportunity to be heard prior to the
termination.' 96 In Loudermill, the Court reached a consensus on
193 See Tulsa Professional Collection Serv. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 489 (1988) (requir-
ing actual notice when party has possession of names of potentially affected individuals).
194 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (establishing balancing test
between private interest in property right, governmental interest in expeditious termina-
tion of right, and the risks associated with erroneous decisions); Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542-44 (1985) (applying Mathews balancing test to employ-
ment rights of tenured public employees).
195 See supra notes 158-66 and accompanying text.
196 The clearest example is drawn from the five separate opinions filed in Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), a case involving the discharge of an employee whose
only pretermination hearing consisted of the right to present his claim to the supervisor
he had accused of corruption. Id. at 137-38. The division at the center of the Court in
Arnelt was between Justice Powell, who found informal predeprivation procedures suffi-
cient, id. at 171 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result in part), and
Justice White, who argued for a full evidentiary hearing before termination. Id. at 185
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Even under Justice Powell's view
of limited pretermination hearing opportunities, the discharged employee must be af-
forded a full evidentiary hearing after the removal. Id. at 170. See also Brock v. Roadway
Express, 481 U.S. 252 (1987) (plurality opinion) (Court again dividing over adequacy of
predeprivation procedures, but agreeing that at some point full evidentiary hearing
must be afforded to terminate property rights).
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allowing a deprivation without a full evidentiary hearing in the pub-
lic employment context, so long as the affected employee is allowed
some opportunity to present her side of the story and so long as a
full evidentiary hearing will follow.' 97 In each case where the Court
upheld a deprivation without a full evidentiary hearing, the Court
was careful to indicate that the employer had made only an interim
decision. Thus, a typical case would involve the type of hearing re-
quired for a preliminary decision regarding the removal of an em-
ployee from the worksite. 198
By contrast, claim preclusion under the pre-Martin collateral at-
tack doctrine would deny vested public employees precisely that op-
portunity to be heard subsequent to the initial deprivation. The
collateral attack doctrine is troubling in that it denies to employees
who have property interests in the terms and conditions of their em-
ployment a full evidentiary hearing at which to defend against a pro-
posed denial of those interests. A tenured emp'oyee's opposition to
a consent decree would constitute the entirety of the procedural
protections owing to her employment and would permanently fore-
close challenge by affected incumbents.' 99 Half-measures, such as
the right to articulate objections at a fairness hearing, would be of-
fered in place of the developed hearing. Rather than placing the
burden of proof on the party wishing to deny such employees their
property interests, the fairness hearing would require that affected
employees establish their continued entitlement to employment.
Moreover, fairness hearings do not guarantee potentially dis-
placed employees the right to have their case argued by counsel, the
right to subpoena witnesses or conduct discovery, or the right to
subject adverse witnesses to cross-examination by counsel of their
197 Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545.
198 See, e.g., Brewer v. Parkman, 918 F.2d 1336, 1339-40 (8th Cir. 1990) (dismissal of
deputy sheriff without pretermination hearing a violation of due process); Kercado-
Melendez v. Aponte-Roque, 829 F.2d 255, 262-63 (1st Cir. 1987) (school superinten-
dent deprived of her due process rights when she was dismissed for political reasons
without a pretermination hearing), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1044 (1988); Duck v.Jacobs, 739
F. Supp. 1545, 1549-50 (S.D. Ga. 1990) (discharge of two police officers without
pretermination hearing violates due process); Barkley v. City ofJackson, 705 F. Supp.
390, 394-95 (W.D. Tenn. 1988) (discharge of policeman without opportunity to respond
to charges prior to termination violates due process).
This principle is not limited to employment cases. In Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,
251 (1978), the Court found that the suspension of public high school students violated
procedural due process when the students were not afforded an opportunity to present
their side of the story prior to disciplinary action.
199 Professor Laycock was the first to focus on the nature of the legal claims of af-
fected third parties. See Laycock, supra note 55, at 122 (addressing foreseeable legal
claims of third parties) and 148-49 (acknowledging difficulty of relatively little invest-
ment in claim for applicants).
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choice. 200 The Eleventh Circuit drew the proper procedural conclu-
sion from the substantive entitlements of the incumbent employees:
"If the plan affects promotion practice so as to alter or abolish the
promotion opportunities of existing employees, these employees
must be represented as parties to the decree if they are to be bound
by it.' '201
Consequently, two constitutional possibilities remain. First, bi-
lateral consent decrees may be given no binding effect as to third
parties. This is the formal holding of Cleveland Firefighters and was
the view that dispositively claimed the majority of the Court in Mar-
tin.20 2 Alternatively, any procedural modifications altering the man-
ner in which vested employees could assert their rights, such as
those in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, may be narrowly construed to
govern only the forum in which incumbents could protect their
rights (the court in which the discrimination claims were filed)20 3
and to set a statute of limitations for the filing of those claims that
runs from the time the incumbent employees' received individual
notice of the proposed alteration of their seniority rights. 2°4
Permitting incumbent employees to register objections at a fair-
ness hearing before a court that is resolving an employment dis-
crimination claim between the employer and minority challengers
would not meet the due process requirements owing to the property
rights of incumbent employees. The right to protest is not an ade-
quate substitute for the right to process. Rather, there must be the
opportunity for a full hearing on any substantive claim raised by in-
cumbents, including the property-based rights identified in this Arti-
cle. The opportunity for a hearing must then include the right to
discovery, to subpoena witnesses, and to appeal an adverse ruling.
200 See Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 47, 47-48 (1971)
(per curiam) (no case or controversy when court confronted with "anomaly that both
litigants desire precisely the same result"); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968) (hold-
ing that federal courts should act only after hearing "dash of adversary argument ex-
ploring every aspect of a multifaceted situation embracing conflicting and demanding
interests").
201 In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492,
1500 (11th Cir. 1987), aff'd sub norm. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
202 Ironically, the earliest exposition of this view comes from Justice Stevens, author
of the dissent in Martin, in his concurring opinion in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784
v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984). In Stotts, the Court reviewed the authority of a district
court to modify an affirmative-action consent decree so as to alter the seniority claims of
white firefighters who were not party to the original consent decree. Justice Stevens
objected to the Court entertaining any discussion of the permissibility of the affirmative
action plan under Title VII. He argued that the district court lacked all authority to
issue orders beyond the four corners of the decree that would reach nonparties to the
decree. Id. at 590-91 (Stevens, J., concurring).
203 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102166, sec. 108, § 703(n)(3) (1991)
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2).
204 See id. sec. 108, § 703(n)(1)(B)(i).
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C. Legitimate and Illegitimate Expectations
Incumbents may well have a property interest in their employ-
ment, and the property interest may indeed trigger procedural pro-
tections, but that cannot end the inquiry. No property rights are
absolute; the purpose of the hearing in the due process line of cases
certainly is not to foreclose an employer from denying property in-
terests, particularly when layoffs are economically mandated or
when social welfare benefits are terminated after eligibility expires.
The hearing instead imposes a check on the arbitrary or erroneous
deprivation of property rights. The purpose served by a due pro-
cess hearing is to insure the protection of the incumbents' rightful
expectations. This is so even in a case such as Martin in which the
fact of prior discrimination against blacks is conclusively established
and in which the corresponding need for a remedy is also
established.
Nevertheless, this question of purpose is particularly troubling
if the incumbents base their claims on the fact that they got the jobs
first and have held them longer. Seniority as an intergenerational
wealth transfer poses difficult problems when the prior assignment
of opportunity was based in part on a now-impermissible denial of
opportunity to racial or ethnic minorities. In such circumstances,
the redistribution of wealth to the older generation locks in, well
into the future, the past discriminatory practices, and rewards those
groups that had previously benefitted from increased opportunity.
Respecting seniority-based expectations thus restricts retrospective
remedies and limits employment discrimination remedies to the
realm of the prospective.
While this Article reviews the legitimacy of protecting estab-
lished employment expectations, it must be recognized that, at least
in the statutory Title VII context, this trade-off between future inte-
gration and respect for pre-existing employment is precisely what
Congress intended. The legislative history reveals quite unambigu-
ously that one of the political compromises which eased the passage
of Title VII was precisely the promise to organized labor that "Title
VII would have no effect on seniority rights existing at the time it
takes effect." 20 5 More directly, the legislative history commanded
that even a discriminatory employer "would not be obliged-or in-
deed, permitted-to fire whites in order to hire Negroes, or... once
Negroes are hired, to give them special seniority rights at the ex-
pense of white workers hired earlier." 20 6 While the legislative his-
205 110 CONG. REC. 7207 (1964) (statement of Senator Clark, one of the "bipartisan
captains" responsible for the Senate debate of Title VII).
206 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964) (memorandum by Senators Clark and Case, the two
"bipartisan captains" for the bill in the Senate).
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tory primarily addresses the prospective effects of prestatute
discrimination, the privileged position of seniority expectations is
nonetheless apparent.
The early remedy cases under Title VII found that while plain-
tiffs may establish liability on a class-wide basis, individual plaintiffs
had to establish claims to noninjunctive relief such as reinstatement
and backpay.20 7 These cases assumed that the primary issue at the
remedy stage would be the employer's backpay liability and there-
fore created a burden-shifting mechanism for establishing the scope
of retrospective relief. Plaintiffs would have the burden of creating
a prima facie case of entitlement to retrospective relief, and once
the prima facie case was made, the burden would shift to the em-
ployer-the party with the best access to information concerning the
actual employment decisions20 8-to come forward to defeat the pre-
sumptive entitlement to relief.
20 9
When relief involves reinstatement, or even "instatement" in a
job, the primary cost-bearer for the discrimination remedy may not
be the employer-discriminator but instead the incumbent employ-
ees. In this context, the case law is far more nuanced. Although the
legal protections of seniority are not absolute, they are significant.
The case law developing the substantive property rights of tenured
incumbents requires that the burden of proof fall on parties seeking
to strip incumbents of these rights. Thus the Supreme Court speaks
of litigation taking as its "starting point- the presumption in favor of
rightful-place seniority"2 10 to confine employment discrimination
remedies to members of a plaintiff class who can "demonstrate that
they have been actual victims of the discriminatory practice [who
should] be awarded competitive seniority and given their rightful
place on the seniority roster."211 Absent proof sufficient to defeat
the seniority-based claims of the incumbents, no antidiscrimination
remedy altering seniority-based rights can stand.21 2
On the other hand, when incumbents' expectational rights are
illegitimately obtained, legal procedures to defeat those rights are
well established. Proof that entrenched rights stem directly from
unlawful discrimination is sufficient to defeat the expectations of in-
207 See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 770-72 (1976); International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359-61 (1977).
208 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360 n.45.
209 Franks, 424 U.S. at 772; Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360.
210 Franks, 424 U.S. at 779 n.41.
211 Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 578-79 (1984).
212 The best examples are found in the court cases striking down the race-based
abrogation of seniority expectations when plaintiffs have failed to show individual-
specific make-whole remedies. See, e.g., Stotts, 467 U.S. 561; Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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cumbents. This is clearest when the hiring or opportunity for ad-
vancement is the proven result of an unlawful refusal to consider
minority or female candidates. A classic example is the white job
applicant who applies on the same day as a black and is chosen for
the position because of racial animus. 213 In such circumstances,
courts would deny the subsequent claim of the white employee to
seniority entitlements vis-a'-vis the black challenger.214 The make-
whole remedy would place the black challenger ahead of the white
employee on the seniority roster, because the white employee's
claim to seniority preferences is illegitimate. 215 The white employee
in such a case may be "innocent" of discrimination but has nonethe-
less benefitted directly from unlawful discrimination. Accordingly,
the white employee's expectations, while not unreasonable, are
tainted by the discriminatory setting in which they were acquired
and can fairly be compromised as necessary to remedy the underly-
ing discrimination.
Any attempt, though, to reconstruct hiring patterns in the ab-
sence of discrimination would show that some, perhaps most, of the
hirees would still have been white. Even in the absence of discrimi-
nation, many of the white incumbents would still have been hired,
would have worked about the same number of years, and would
have come into all the entitlements to job security and benefits in
which they are currently claiming a property interest.
Thus the case law offers specific mechanisms for defeating sen-
iority claims that stem from unlawful exclusion by restoring proven
victims to the positions on the seniority roster they would have oc-
cupied but for the discrimination. 21 6 It does not, however, allow the
213 See, e.g., Association Against Discrimination in Employment, Inc. v. City of
Bridgeport, 647 F.2d 256, 266 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982); Ingram v.
Madison Square Garden Ctr., Inc., 482 F. Supp. 414, 418-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), modified,
709 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983).
214 See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 193 n.3 (1987):
The law violator who would oppose a remedy imposed against him as
itself a violation of the law does not stand in the same position as an
innocent party; those whom the court has found in the wrong may not
oppose a remedy on the ground that it would constitute a wrong if lev-
eled at a non-participant in the litigation.
(Stevens,J., concurring in thejudgment). See also Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliv-
erers' Union, 514 F.2d 767, 775 (2d Cir. 1975) (acknowledging that, but for racial dis-
crimination, whites would not have had the seniority they enjoyed), cert. denied, 427 U.S.
911 (1976).
215 See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 774 (1976) ("[D]enial ofsen-
iority relief to identifiable victims of racial discrimination on the sole ground that such
relief diminishes the expectations of other, arguably innocent, employees would if ap-
plied generally frustrate the central make whole objective of Title VII.") (emphasis
added).
216 See, e.g., United States v. East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 560 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (where 38 victorious plaintiffs claimed entitlements to ret-
1992] 233
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
wholesale elimination or diminution of established seniority rights
for the benefit of the preferred group as a class. 21 7 It also places-the
burden of proving the lack of entitlement on the party seeking re-
lief, both at the liability and the remedy stages of litigation.218
The purpose of the due process hearing, therefore, is to insure
that the rightful expectations of the incumbents are protected. The
hearing must provide process commensurate with the substantive
legal entitlements applicable in the seniority context. First, the
hearing must determine whether the incumbent employees have
sufficiently realized expectation interests in their positions to create
a cognizable property right. Absent this right, incumbent employ-
ees are in the weaker position evident in Weber andJohnson.21 9 Sec-
ond, the hearing must determine whether the individuals being
given preferences are within the make-whole remedial scheme of
employment discrimination claims. Specifically, the hearing should
determine whether individuals granted super-seniority are identifi-
able victims of prior discrimination for whom the award of retroac-
tive seniority is a return to a position that they would have occupied
but for the discrimination. Third, the hearing must determine
whether the seniority-based expectations of the incumbent employ-
ees are tarnished by the prior practice of discrimination so as to jus-
tify legally defeating those expectations. 220
roactive seniority, 22 individual claims were resolved by pre-existing union grievance
procedures, and 16 were resolved by the court after hearings at which all parties were
represented), aft'd, 643 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1981).
217 See Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) ("No one doubts
that there has been serious racial discrimination in this country. But as the basis for
imposing discriminatory legal remedies that work against innocent people, societal dis-
crimination is insufficient and overexpansive."). Cf Romasanta v. United Air Lines, 717
F.2d 1140 (7th Cir. 1983) (exceptional holding that reinstatement of 1400 flight atten-
dants who had been the victims of sex discrimination would so devastate the rights of
incumbents that the "presumption in favor of rightful place seniority relief," Franks, 424
U.S. at 779 n.41, was defeated), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 944 (1984).
218 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 292 ("In 'reverse discrimination' suits, as in any other suit, it
is the plaintiffs who must bear the burden of demonstrating that their rights have been
violated.") (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
219 The key finding in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), was that
the employer's creation of a new craft training program created a new area of promo-
tional opportunity so that no pre-existing expectation of the dispreferred white employ-
ees was affected. Prior to the creation of this new promotional ladder, white production
employees such as the claimant Brian Weber had no means of securing a promotion
within the Kaiser Aluminum plant. Id. at 208. Similarly, in Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), the Court expressly found that the dispreferred employee,
Paul Johnson, did not have a realized expectation interest in the promotion at stake. Id.
at 638; see supra text accompanying notes 104-08.
220 There are tremendous costs to the "bumping" of incumbent employees who
have not achieved their positions or advanced on the seniority roster as a result of dis-
crimination against other applicants. The problems were cogently captured by William
L. Robinson, the former Executive Director of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
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The Birmingham decree did not follow these procedures. By
discarding seniority expectations without either evaluating the in-
cumbent employees' claims of entitlement or engaging in
individual-specific claims for restoration to the seniority roster, the
consent decree in Birmingham attempted a result that may have
been unavailable had the case been fully litigated. To then claim the
power of the court to foreclose subsequent challenge by the affected
incumbents creates the collateral attack dilemma finally rejected by
the Court in Martin.
In place of the due process protections owed to seniority-based
property rights, the pre-Martin collateral attack doctrine only of-
fered incumbents the opportunity to raise objections at a settlement
fairness hearing. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), how-
ever, the orientation of the fairness hearing is to the best interests of
the plaintiff class. 22' The rights of affected incumbents are at best
swept under the rubric of the public interest, a decidedly secondary
concern for the court.222 Instead of benefitting from a presumed
entitlement to their positions, incumbent employees must instead
shoulder the burden of challenging the propriety of the settlement
terms. Moreover, to the extent that focusing on seniority-based ex-
pectations takes the issues beyond the discrimination-reverse dis-
crimination model, it becomes clear that the rights implicated are
not defined within the original cause of action. A court passing
upon the merits of a bipolar settlement is left at the mercy of liti-
Under Law, in response to the proposal that the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission utilize such remedies:
If such relief were ever put into effect, it would predictably result in enor-
mous dissension in the workplace, pitting white employees against black
employees, and male employees against female employees.
It is difficult to imagine the EEOC's rationale for junking the tried,
effective, and-most importantly-widely accepted remedy of goals and
timetables for filling future vacancies, in favor of an unrealistic form of
relief benefitting far fewer victims of discrimination and causing so much
practical difficulty.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Update: Policies on Pay Equity and Title VII Enforce-
ment Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong., Ist Sess.
59-60 (June 21, 1985) (testimony of William L. Robinson).
221 7B CHARLEs A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D
§ 1797.1, at 392-93 (1986).
222 Indeed one of the leading commentators on class actions does not even list the
"public interest" as within the proper concerns of a court approving a consent decree.
Instead the listed concerns are:
1. Likelihood of recovery, or likelihood of success
2. Amount and nature of discovery or evidence
3. Settlement terms and conditions
4. Recommendation and experience of counsel
5. Future expense and likely duration of litigation
6. Recommendation of neutral parties, if any
7. Number of objectors and nature of objections
2 HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLAss ACTIONS § 11A2 (2d ed. 1985).
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gants, who have every incentive to obtain a judicial imprimatur, to
advise it of whatever third-party claims may be implicated.223 At the
very least, Martin, by securing access to a hearing for affected incum-
bents, brought the procedural law into conformity with the substan-
tive doctrines. 22
4
No doubt part of the civil rights attack on Martin is motivated by
the fact that the white firefighters have not only enjoyed the benefits
of Birmingham's segregated past, but have also resisted attempts to
change it. Perhaps because of shared barracks, firefighters' unions
have unfortunately been at the forefront of attempts to keep minori-
ties, women, and homosexuals from securing equal employment
rights. But in thecivil context no less than in the criminal context,
the enjoyment of rights secured by due process cannot be made to
turn on the enlightened or benevolent nature of the rights-holder.
The firefighters of Birmingham, whatever their beliefs or values, are
working people fearfully clinging to what little economic security
this society has offered them.22 5 Their expectations should be af-
forded the legal protections due, regardless whether their views on
matters of racial equality are enlightened or not.
22 6
223 Nor is it clear that courts will as a general matter even expand the scope of the
fairness hearing to third parties. See Maimon Schwarzchild, Title VII Consent Decrees and
the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE LJ. 887, 919-29.
224 The appropriate match between the nature of the substantive claims and the pro-
cess that the judicial system must provide is the key to the methodology of this Article.
Several commentators have framed the procedural limitations on consent decrees in
terms of the substantive claims that all parties to the litigation might advance. See, e.g.,
Laycock, supra note 55, at 124-28 (analyzing consent decrees in terms of third-party in-
terests); Kramer, supra note 190, at 341 (analyzing procedural objections that third par-
ties might interpose to a consent decree in terms of substantive claims available to third
parties). However, the inquiry into the specific claims of incumbent employees in em-
ployment discrimination consent decrees has only been touched on in the commentary
to date. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REv.
1060, 1098 n.180 (1991) (entertaining possibility that harm occasioned by affirmative
action plan might rise to the level of a constitutional injury).
225 A particularly unbecoming view of the claims of incumbent firefighters emerges
from Robert Joffe, a partner at Cravath, Swaine & Moore and attorney for the black
challengers in Birmingham. When asked to explain the apparent disparity between the
disruptions to the interests of incumbents in Birmingham and Cravath's record of no
black partners and only five black associates, Joffe replied that Cravath took a mer-
itocratic view of hiring that placed a premium on "hiring from among the most quali-
fied." Second-Class Citizens, AMERCAN LAWYER, Sept. 1989, at 97. ShouldJoffe ever have
occasion to be pulled from a burning building, perhaps his views of merit in the blue-
collar world will be enlightened. Nonetheless, the refusal to afford the same respect for
the expectations of the blue-collar workforce as professionals is consistent with an un-
fortunate pattern in antidiscrimination law. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title
VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1982) (addressing disparity in treatment
of blue- and white-collar jobs under Title VII).
226 Even the focus on the racial attitudes of the white incumbents underestimates the





CONSENT DECREES AND SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
The approach delineated in this Article is premised on a critical
distinction between vested rights and lesser claims for the protec-
tion of interests or aspirations. While incumbents might claim
vested rights outside the context of public employment, it is only in
the public employment context, by virtue of the state action doc-
trine, that the positive constitutional case law has recognized such
rights and elevated them to the status of property. In the legal
shorthand, vested rights in public employment are a sufficient but
perhaps not necessary condition for the analysis developed in this
Article. Thus, whether incumbent, nonpublic employees may claim
similar substantive entitlements is beyond the scope of this Article.
Property rights in public employment were defined in the Roth-
Loudenmill line of cases by the type of hearing required before an
employer might make an adverse decision concerning employ-
ment.227 For those with property rights in public employment, the
commands of due process must-be satisfied commensurate with the
privileged position given to employment in the government benefits
case law. Thus, the analytic framework of this Article does not reach
claims made by entry-level aspirants who lack any substantive enti-
dement. While this analysis does not address the extent of protec-
tion under the due process framework required for those claiming
mere interests or aspirations, it does suggest an answer: the nega-
tive implication of the Roth-Loudermill case law indicates that there is
no due process claim for those who cannot claim a pre-existing sub-
stantive entitlement to the job in question. Under the Mathews v.
Eldridge line of cases, procedural protections flow from the underly-
ing substantive rights, and the absence of a substantive claim dooms
the procedural claim.228
This Article has sought to establish the overlap between the
due process cases and the substantive law of affirmative action.
Although the two are not matched up in either the Court's decisions
As the industries in which they are employed become suburbanized, a
growing number of inner-city white ethnics find that not only are they
trapped in the inner city because of the high cost of suburban housing,
but they are physically removed from job opportunities. This situation
increases the potential for racial tensions as white European ethnics com-
pete with blacks and the rapidly growing Hispanic population for access
to and control of the remaining decent schools, housing, and neighbor-
hoods. And explanations that their negative response to minority en-
croachment is due to racial prejudice hardly capture the dynamic factors
of societal organization that channel racial antagonisms.
WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 136 (1990).
227 See supra notes 113-77 and accompanying text.
228 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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or the commentary,229 the focus on the nature of the substantive
claims of the adversely affected dispreferred defines the permissible
boundaries of affirmative action in much the same way as these sub-
stantive claims define due process protections. When discrete num-
bers of identifiable individuals were forced to shoulder the cost of
remedies at the expense of pre-existing vested expectations, the
Court has struck down affirmative action programs. When the im-
pact of affirmative action programs was spread among a broad pool
and did not directly compromise the rights of the dispreferred, the
Court generally upheld such remedial endeavors. 230 Thus, the af-
firmative action case law parallels the due process cases in its con-
cern for the vested rights of incumbents. Although this Article is
primarily concerned with the treatment of such vested rights, this
analysis suggests that neither the due process nor the affirmative ac-
tion case law would be an obstacle to liberal, entry-level affirmative
action.
The narrow procedural issue of Martin v. Wilks addressed
whether the process of court-approved consent decrees may be sub-
stituted for the full due process protections normally owed to vested
public employees who claim a diminution of their right to employ-
ment opportunity. More than a matter of procedural formalism, this
issue involves the incentives at play in bipolar settlements to shift
costs onto unrepresented third parties and to enforce that cost-
shifting through judicial decree.
A. The Problem of Public Issue Litigation
Consent decrees in public litigation 23 1 are inherently trouble-
some. Such decrees permit private parties to invoke the judiciary's
enforcement authority to define rights that are consistent with what
the parties believe would be the litigated outcome. These decrees
avoid the mediating lens of the court and the accompanying public
scrutiny, and avoid the "procedural limitations on the exercise" of
229 See supra notes 150-224 and accompanying text.
230 This point was succinctly expressed by David S. Tatel, former Director of the
Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Education and current Co-Chair of the Law-
yers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law:
[T]o determine whether a race-conscious program is acceptable, you look
to the impact it has on non-minorities. And the Court has said that inno-
cent whites-innocent non-minorities-may need to accept some burden
in our society, and that you measure the extent of that burden by how
diffuse the impact is. If it is a diffuse impact, if it is a nonintrusive impact,
if it is not an undue impact, then it's constitutionally tolerable.
Lloyd N. Cutler & David S. Tatel, Minority Scholarship Policy, 5 COMMrrTEE REPORT 12, 13
(1991).
231 See Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 4 (1982); Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979).
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the court's power that are inherent in adjudication. 2 2 The very
concept of public litigation implies that more is at stake in the litiga-
tion than just the resolution of a dispute between two parties. Not
only does the diffuse impact2 3 or externalities of public litigation
extend beyond the actual litigants, it also compromises the parties'
claims to control the litigation as they see fit.2M Moreover, even
without the externalities, settlements in public litigation resolve the
immediate dispute between the litigants at the expense of clarifying
and reinforcing legal principles for future claims. 23 5
The effect of consent decrees on third parties has prompted a
large body of commentary in both the academic literature and the
legislative records accompanying the Civil Rights Act of 1991. In
dispute in this body of work is the precise nature of the consent
decree. The views range from one extreme that views the decree as
"a contract all the same" 23 6 to another that purports to entrust the
judicial approval of the decree with the full al fair review of the
rights of all affected third parties.237 Some see consent decrees as
232 Owen M. Fiss,Justice Chicago Style, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 4.
233 See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353, 394-
404 (1978) (exploring the inherent tensions in affording all affected parties meaningful
participation in polycentric litigation); Schwarzchild, supra note 223, at 901-08 (describ-
ing inherent tensions in public law consent decrees).
234 See Chayes, supra note 231, at 5; Fiss, supra note 231, at 17-28.
235 See Jules Coleman & Charles SilverJustice in Settlements, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y, Au-
tumn 1986, at 103; Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073 (1984).
236 Frank H. Easterbrook,Justice and Contract in ComsentJudgraents, 1987 U. CH. LEGAL
F. 19, 20. The lines in the case law are by no means dear. Even in Cleveland Firefighters,
for example, which gave significant legal force to the consent of the primary parties to
the litigation, one can still find references to the contractual nature of consent decrees
since, according to the Court, "the parties' consent animates the legal force of a consent
decree." Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525
(1989).
237 See Hearings, supra note 23, at 572 (comments of Thomas D. Barr) (courts do not
enter consent decrees unless "thoroughly convinced that all aspects have been explored
carefully and thoroughly by parties adverse as well as parties in favor"). Mr. Barr's views
may be somewhat hyperbolic given his firm's representation of the black plaintiffs in the
Birmingham firefighters dispute. One would hardly expect that Cravath, Swaine &
Moore, Mr. Barr's law firm, would accept disposition of their clients' rights except by full
and vigorous litigation. See generally RENATA ADLER, REcKxLEss DISREGARD (1986)
(describing aggressive litigation of Cravath lawyers Barr and Boies on behalf of institu-
tional clients).
By and large, courts have been sensitive to the fact that nonparties in fairness hear-
ings have no right of discovery, no capacity to depose adverse witnesses, no ability to
compel testimony of adverse or hostile witnesses under subpoena, and no right of ap-
peal. Accordingly, courts have been leery of foreclosing legal rights based upon the
ability to raise objections at a fairness hearing. See Mark Recktenwald, Comment, Collat-
eral Attacks on Employment Discrimination Consent Decrees, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 147, 181 n. 139
(1986) (few courts have approved use of fairness hearing to dispose of nonminority
claims). But see Dennison v. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 658 F.2d 694 (9th Cir.
1981) (fairness hearing is sufficient opportunity to present incumbent employee claims);
Kramer, supra note 190, at 358-60 (arguing that opportunity to be heard at fairness hear-
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necessary hybrids between contract and adjudication, 28s while
others are skeptical about any claims to meaningful judicial over-
sight of the settlement process. 23 9 There are also more instrumen-
tal concerns about the needs of the judicial system to allow for the
settlement of claims, including those that implicate public issues. 240
The consent as contract argument views the consent decree as
little more than a registration with the court of the understanding of
the parties to the dispute.24' Under this view, the purpose of the
court's imprimatur under a consent decree as opposed to a private
contract is threefold: First, in class actions, the consent decree pro-
vides protection to nonparticipating class members; -second, the de-
cree binds all members of the plaintiff class without their having
been signatories to the actual decree; and third, the decree allows
for court enforcement, particularly if the decree envisions long-term
structural changes likely to give rise to disputes as to their
administration.
Thus envisioned, the consent decree does not and cannot dis-
pose of the rights of nonsignatories. As Professor Laycock argues,
consent decrees provide no basis for a presumption of validity for
an assertion of the rights of the parties to the disputes as opposed to
nonparticipating third parties.242 Not only is there no adjudication
or determination of the defendant's liability in the action-in-chief,
but there is also no meaningful judicial declaration of the illegiti-
macy or invalidity of rights claimed by third parties.2 43
This view has support in cases that reject the contention that
the interests of unionized incumbents are protected by governmen-
tal employers or enforcement agencies. 244 This is also the view ulti-
mately adopted by the Court in Martin: "A judgment or decree
among parties to a lawsuit resolves issues as among them, but it
ing is critical to due process protections and is necessary for collateral attack rule to be
constitutional).
238 See Kramer, supra note 190, at 324.
239 See Judith Resnick, Juding Consent, 1987 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 43, 101-02.
240 See Burt Neuborne & Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., A Prelude to the Settlement of Wil-
der, 1987 U. Ci. LEGAL F. 177, 180-83.
241 See, e.g., United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1971); 3 A.C.
FREEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 1350, at 2773 (5th ed. 1925).
242 Laycock, supra note 55, at 104.
243 Id. at 110-17. See also Thomas M. Mengler, Consent Decree Paradigms: Models With-
out Meaning, 29 B.C. L. REV. 291, 332 (1988) (failure to consider "third parties' claim on
clean slate . .. violates due process"). Cf W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461
U.S. 757, 770 (1977) (holding that inconsistent employer obligations arising out of set-
tlement of discrimination claim did not extinguish contract-based claims of incumbent
employees).
244 See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 548 F.2d 1232, 1235 (5th Cir. 1977);
Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 921 (1976).
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does not conclude the rights of strangers to those proceedings." 245
The Martin Court held that in order to be bound in personam, the
process must comport with "our 'deep-rooted historic tradition that
everyone should have his own day in court.'"246 Accordingly, not
even the possibility of the entry of a consent decree triggers an af-
firmative duty on the part of third parties to seek intervention to
protect their erstwhile legal rights.
The contrary view dominates the Court's opinion in Cleveland
Firefighters and underlies the dissent in Martin. For Justice Brennan
in Cleveland Firefighters, although consent decrees arise out of a con-
tractual understanding between the parties, they nonetheless "bear
some of the earmarks ofjudgments entered after litigation. ' 247 The
decree represents a quasi-judgment of the court reflecting a judicial
determination that the "decree must spring forth from and serve to
resolve a dispute within the court's subject-matter jurisdiction...
and must further the objectives of the law upor which the complaint
was based." 248 Paradoxically, the Court in Cleveland Firefighters went
on to confer upon courts the authority to give consent decrees with
"broader relief than the court could have awarded after a trial."249
Although the Court in Cleveland Firefighters expressly stopped short
of giving a consent decree the preclusive effects of other court de-
terminations, the Court's dicta imply that such decrees merit protec-
tion from collateral attack as would other judicial decrees.
B. Incentives and Collusion
The dissent in Martin is handicapped by an incomplete under-
standing of the incentives at work in the remedial stage of litigation.
While recognizing that judicial decrees could effectively bind third
parties and that, consequently, parties to litigation could have joint
incentives to secure a judicial imprimatur on their contractual ar-
rangements, the dissent did not inquire further. Rather, the dissent
did not look beyond century-old case law which allowed for third-
party challenge to a judgment secured through corruption, duress,
fraud, collusion, or mistake.250 As the classic formulation would
have it:
245 Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989).
246 Id. (quoting 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 221, § 4449, at 417 (1981)).
247 Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519
(1989). See also Railway Employees v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 650-52 (1961); United
States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1932).
248 Cleveland Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 525.
249 Id.
250 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS §§ 69-72 (1982); Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 755 (1989). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 has provided a statutory exception to the
collateral attack bar when a consent decree "was obtained through collusion or fraud."
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 108, § 703(n)(2)(c) (1991).
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[W]henever a judgment or decree is procured through the fraud
of either of the parties, or by the collusion of both, for the pur-
pose of defrauding some third person, such third person may es-
cape from the injury thus attempted by showing, even in a
collateral proceeding, the fraud or collusion by which the judg-
ment was obtained. 2
5 1
Accordingly, since "[t]he litigation in which the consent decrees
were entered was a genuine adversary proceeding," 252 there could
be no issue of fraud or collusion, and as a result, the decrees became
unassailable in the eyes of the dissenters. 253
Although it is true that the underlying lawsuits in cases such as
Martin and Cleveland Firefighters are not collusive, as articulated by
Justice Stevens in Martin,254 this question is miscast for purposes of
examining the incentive structures in settlements. The Martin dis-
senters overlook the decisive shift in incentives as the lawsuit moves
from the determination of liability to the structuring of a remedy. 255
In the early stages of litigation, an institutional defendant such as
the City of Birmingham has every reason to defend against liability
until either liability has been determined by the court or the plain-
tiffs' likelihood of success becomes manifest.256 Until that time, the
interests of all individuals with a preference for the status quo, in-
cluding potentially affected incumbents, are fully aligned with the
governmental defendant.
Once the inquiry moves beyond the determination of liability,
however, the calculus is radically altered, as is apparent in the facts
of the Birmingham case. As a result of years of unlawful discrimina-
tion, the City faced substantial exposure under Title VII. Although
part of the remedy would consist of the award of retroactive senior-
ity to individual discriminatees, 257 the exposure would not be lim-
251 Michaels v. Post, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 398, 426-27 (1874) (footnote omitted).
252 Martin, 490 U.S. at 762 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
253 Id. at 775-77.
254 Id
255 The realignment of parties once litigation passes from liability to remedy is by no
means confined to the consent decree process. An interesting example is provided by
the Agent Orange litigation in which, as recounted by Professor Peter Schuck, in the
period after a settlement was reached on liability, "the struggle was no longer primarily
between the plaintiffs and the defendants, for the latter had. . . 'bought their peace.' It
was a conflict among the veterans, and between them and their lawyers." PETER H.
SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL 168 (1987).
256 This contrasts with the normal pattern of determining litigation settlement zones
by the sum of the anticipated expenses of both parties, assuming a shared assumption
about the likelihood of plaintiffs' prevailing and the size of the likely judgment. See
Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100
YALE LJ. 73, 101 (1990). The settlement dynamics are harder to calibrate in cases that
raise volatile political issues and in which the decisionmakers, corporate political bodies,
are basically litigating with public rather than personal funds.
257 See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 774 (1976).
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ited to such injunctive relief. The major remedy, from the City's
vantage point, would be backpay for those unlawfully excluded
black applicants-a figure that was calculated to be roughly five mil-
lion dollars. 258
What then becomes of the incentive to litigate to preserve the
status quo? Clearly, the greater the backpay liability, the greater the
incentive to offer plaintiffs an exchange in which backpay is waived
in favor of hiring and promotional preferences. 25 9 For plaintiffs,
such an exchange is beneficial for two separate reasons. First, the
prevailing law on the question of specific, make-whole remedies is
onerous.260 Only previously denied applicants who would have
been entitled to positions but for the discrimination are entitled to
reinstatement to those positions.261 Second, the aim of civil rights
litigation is generally prospective, particularly when plaintiffs are
represented by the institutional civil rights bar.26 2
258 Hearings, supra note 23, at 388 (testimony of Raymond Fitzpatrick, counsel for
nonminority firefighters in Martin, that potential backpay liability of Birmingham in 1975
(at time of initial suit filed by U.S. Department ofJustice) was $5 million).
259 The Court has recognized this practice. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193, 211 (1979) ("Preferential hiring... is a reasonable response for the employer,
whether or not a court, on [the same] facts, could order the same step as a remedy. The
company is able to avoid identifying victims of past discrimination, and so avoids claims
for backpay that would inevitably follow .... ") (Blackmun, J., concurring).
260 For a cogent critique of the "victims-only" standard of relief, see Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78,
91-98 (1986). Professor Sullivan criticizes the Court for resisting categorical statements
of how much "punishment" of the dispreferred may be exacted within tolerable affirma-
tive action programs. She views the requirement that compensation be given only to
identifiable victims as overly restrictive and politically unnecessary in a white-dominated
society. As developed in this Article, the author is far less comfortable with political
institutions deciding to remedy their past sins by passing the costs on to relatively pow-
erless subgroups of the population, even when those subgroups are of the same race as
the political powers that be.
261 See Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501
(1986).
mhe language of [Title VII § 706(g)] is dear. No order of the Court shall
require promotion of an individual whose failure to receive promotion
was for a reason other than discrimination prohibited by the statute.
Here the failure of the District Court to make any finding that the minor-
ity firefighters who will receive preferential promotions were the victims
of racial discrimination requires us to conclude on this record that the
City's failure to advance them was not "on account of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin."
I at 544 (RehnquistJ., dissenting). See also Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts,
467 U.S. 561, 579 (1984) ("mere membership in the disadvantaged class is insufficient
to warrant a seniority award; each individual must prove that the discriminatory practice
had an impact on him" (citing International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 367-71 (1977))); BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIM-
INATION LAw 11-14 (1983-85 Cum. Supp. to 2d ed. 1987).
262 See Derrick A. Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE LJ. 470 (1976); MARK V. TuSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL
STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION 146-58 (1987).
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Again this incentive scheme is borne out in the facts of Birming-
ham. While the City faced potential backpay liability of five million
dollars in 1975, it ultimately settled six years later for only $265,000
in back pay, accompanied by a fifty percent hiring quota for promo-
tions to lieutenant in the fire department.263 In the candid words of
Birmingham Mayor Richard Arrington at his deposition, this was the
"best business deal" the City ever made.
264
This type of tradeoff raises the specter of cost-shifting to facili-
tate settlement. An institutional defendant is allowed to escape di-
rect sanction by avoiding the greatest economic consequences of its
unlawful conduct-an award of backpay. The defendant does so by
consenting to entry-level affirmative action and a reordering of pro-
motional opportunity. The first does not disrupt any settled expec-
tations and, so long as not encumbered by fixed quotas or excessive
attributions, 265 has generally been upheld.. The second, however,
directly defeats the settled expectations of incumbents to advance as
a reward for loyal and capable service. Once the apparent cost of
liability defeats the institutional defendant's "taste for discrimina-
tion," 2 66 the logical desire to avoid the economic consequences of a
determination of liability provides every incentive to settle if settle-
ment avoids at least a significant portion of the potential liability.
2 67
The prospects for avoiding defendant's liability are dramatically im-
263 Hearings, supra note 23, at 388 (testimony of Raymond Fitzpatrick, counsel for
nonminority firefighters in Martin).
264 Quoted in Joint Appendix, Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), at 520-27.
265 See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-09 (1979) (setting forth
requirements for permissible affirmative action as: not unnecessarily trammeling inter-
ests of dispreferred, no absolute bar to white advancement, time limits on effect of af-
firmative action plan, goal of eliminating racial imbalance rather than maintaining racial
balance, and a foreseeable end date for the plan).
266 See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 14 (2d ed. 1971) ("Ifan
individual has a 'taste for discrimination,' he must act as if he were willing to pay some-
thing, either directly or in the form of a reduced income, to be associated with some
persons instead of others."). See also John J. Donahue, Further Thoughts on Employment
Discrimination Legislation: A Reply toJudge Posner, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 523 (1987); Richard A.
Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 513 (1987); JohnJ.
Donahue, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 (1986).
267 An unscientific example from teaching employment law helps illustrate this
point. I ask students to devise a legal strategy for a large corporate employer in a small
town (based in part on Kaiser Aluminum in Gramercy, Louisiana-the fact pattern in
Weber) faced with a provable history of discrimination and informed of the likelihood of
suit from an NAACP chapter. After exploring the exposure of the employer to various
types of court-ordered remedies, the students invariably advise their client to attempt to
avoid backpay liability by settling on the basis of future employment opportunity for the
discriminatees. The student-counselors advise their client to willingly give away promo-
tional rights of present employees as a means of avoiding a backpay award which entails
out-of-pocket payment by the employer.
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proved if a third party can be forced to absorb a significant share of
the costs.
2 68
From an economic vantage point, settlements are facilitated if
significant benefits to plaintiffs are available without the risk of trial
and those benefits may be had at low cost to defendants. 269 Again
this is evident from the Martin litigation, in which the Equal Employ-
ment Advisory Council, a nationwide association of private employ-
ers, filed an amicus brief with the Supreme Court cautioning that
failure to overturn Martin would
seriously affect the utility of consent decrees as a means of resolv-
ing class claims of discrimination in employment, since much of
the incentive to an employer to enter into such a decree would be
destroyed if the employer were left vulnerable to subsequent law-
suits by persons or groups claiming that the employer's compli-
ance with the consent decree constituted discrimination against
them.27
0
But ease of settlement cannot justify this outcome if the affected
third parties, in this case incumbent employees, are not the proper
cost-bearers, in effect, to subsidize the settlement.
271
Although courts have been attentive to the importance of settle-
ment under Title VII, 272 the ease of settlement cannot of its own
accord justify imposing costs on the dispreferred incumbents. Liti-
gants cannot dangle the benefits of settlement before a court in or-
der to secure judicial authority forcing third-party subsidies of the
settlement. This is particularly apparent when, as in Birmingham,
the subject of attack is the municipality itself-the perfect symbol
and cost-bearer for the systemic, broad-scale discrimination that
characterized the societal norms of that city. The City is not merely
268 See Laycock, supra note 55, at 116 (reviewing social science literature on incen-
tives for parties in trilateral disputes to form coalitions in which two adverse parties join
forces against a third party).
269 For an overview of the economic literature on the economic incentives for settle-
ment, see Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and
Their Resolution, 27J. EcoN. Lrr. 1067, 1075-78 (1989). The early works in this field were
John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973); and Richard
A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 399 (1973); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14J. LAw. EcON.
61(1971).
270 Brief, Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council in Support of
Petitioners at 3, Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), quoted in H.R. REP. No. 644, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 33-34 (1990).
271 See Kramer, supra note 190, at 333. Although Professor Kramer does not address
the issue of incentives to pass costs onto unrepresented third parties, he reaches a simi-
lar conclusion from a narrower procedural argument that settlement per se cannot be
the ultimate end in the litigation process and, a fortiori, that it cannot be the justification
for the diminution of procedural rights of third parties. Id.
272 See Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n.14 (1981). See also
Schwarzchild, supra note 223, at 899.
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a "stakeholder" 273 in possession of a finite resource for which two
distinct groups are competing, but is instead the culpable party, in
both a moral and legal sense, for the unlawful discrimination giving
rise to the litigation. Far from being an episodic occurrence, the
segregation of municipal employment in Birmingham was of a piece
with an unyielding societal devotion to racial discrimination that
stretched from cradle to grave. Allowing the City, the perfect proxy
for a generalized pattern of official discrimination, to pass off a sig-
nificant part of the costs of remedy onto a discrete, finite group is
inherently troublesome.
The inequities are further revealed by examining the relative
weight of the costs among the alternative cost-bearers. The cost to
the City of a backpay award, even in the case of a substantial judg-
ment, is relatively low and can be spread among a broad tax base.
Although the absolute value of a settlement based on voiding sen-
iority expectations may be lower than one based on full backpay, the
costs to the affected incumbent individuals are both extremely local-
ized and extraordinarily high in terms of disrupting their most sig-
nificant lifeholding-their job and its attendant privileges and
conditions. By allowing the City to redirect the costs of settlement
to a narrower and more vulnerable class of cost-bearers, the legiti-
macy of the settlement is fundamentally compromised.
The neat dichotomy between collusive and fully litigated law-
suits therefore unravels as the issue of distributing the costs of the
settlement outside the parties to the litigation is introduced. Nor is
this problem confined to the affirmative action remedy situation.
Professors Laycock 274 and Epstein275 have applied a similar analysis
to institutional litigation between the City of New York and the
American Civil Liberties Union over access to social services pro-
vided by denominational social service agencies.2 76 Despite a genu-
ine contest over the merits of the case, the remedy, binding on
Catholic and Jewish relief agencies, was jointly desired by the
original parties to the lawsuit.277 What had begun as adverse litiga-
273 The "stakeholder" analogy is used by the Eleventh Circuit in the Martin litigation
to describe the situation of the City in negotiating the consent decrees. See In re Bir-
mingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492, 1499 (1 1th Cir.
1987), aff'd sub nom. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989). The City may be thought of as
simply a "stakeholder" only in the sense that once a remedy is limited to reassignment
of a finite number ofjobs, the City has no direct interest in how those jobs are distrib-
uted among competing groups. This argument overlooks the role of the City in creating
the unlawful conditions giving rise to the complex remedy issues.
274 Laycock, supra note 55, at 106.
275 Richard A. Epstein, Wilder v. Bernstein: Squeeze Play by Consent Decree, 1987 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 209, 224.
276 Wilder v. Bernstein, 645 F. Supp. 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
277 See Neuborne & Schwarz, supra note 238, at 206.
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tion between a municipal defender of the status quo and an organi-
zational reformer became decisively nonadversarial as soon as
remedial obligations could be shifted to nonparticipating third
parties.
There is, moreover, the inescapable issue of shifting political
tides. One of the central premises of the affirmative action jurispru-
dence is that the majority community in implementing affirmative
action programs, was acting through the political processes to as-
sume a burden that the majority community would ultimately
bear278 in order to benefit the classically vulnerable "discrete and
insular minorities" 279; thus the distinction between benign and stig-
matizing preferences. 2 0 However, when such a preference is en-
acted to benefit the group attaining political power, as was the case
in Birmingham after the first capture of local power by blacks in the
election of Mayor Richard Arrington, the presumption of benign
purpose is eroded. Simply put, "it works both ways: a law that fa-
vors Blacks over Whites would be suspect if it were enacted by a
predominantly Black legislature." 28 1
C. Rethinking Consent Decrees in Light of Their Effect on
Substantive Rights
Out of the academic debate over the role of consent decrees
emerged a strong set of views, encompassing a surprisingly broad
swath of political currents, that rejected any claim to parties' being
278 See John H. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Discrimination, 41 U. COH. L. REv.
723, 735 (1974) ("When the group that controls the decision making process dassifies
so as to advantage a minority and disadvantage itself, the reasons for being unusually
suspicious, and, consequently, employing a stringent brand of review are lacking").
279 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
280 See JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTmusT 170 (1980) (concerns for misuse
of political power not present when "white majority" burdens itself; see also Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 295 (1986) (Marshall,J., dissenting); Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Black-
mun,JJ., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); id. at 400 (separate opinion
of Marshall, J.).
281 Ely, supra note 278, at 739 n.58. See also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 495-96 (1989) (noting that political power in Richmond, Virginia, had
shifted to a majority black city council in striking down fixed minority set-asides for
municipal contracts); Aleinikoff, supra note 221, at 1102-05 (describing Court's view that
"raw political power" exercised by black elected officials to pay back constituents). The
recognition that shifting political tides might affect equal protection claims has roots
going back at least a century. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879)
If in those states where the colored people constitute a majority of the
entire population a law should be enacted excluding all white men from
jury service, thus denying to them the privilege of participating equally
with the blacks in the administration ofjustice, we apprehend that no one
would be heard to claim that it would not be a denial to white men of the
equal protection of the laws.
Id at 308.
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able to achieve by consent decree any more than they could by con-
tract.282 These arguments, from the vantage point of this Article,
are generally correct in linking procedural rights to the underlying
substantive claims but are imprecise because they do not distinguish
among the types of externalities that consent decrees impose. Once
one accepts that the quality of "adjudication" is poor when a court
reviews a consent decree,283 it follows that little weight should be
given to the ruling of a court that is left in the unenviable position of
relying on parties who are jointly interested in securing judicial
approval. 28
4
The problem with this approach, however, is that it does not
identify any stopping point short of repudiating settlement of public
litigation altogether. 28 5 Indeed, the dissent in Martin offers a more
coherent, albeit incorrect, answer to this problem by simply denying
any legal significance to the external impact of a bilateral consent
decree: "The fact that one of the effects of a decree is to curtail the
job opportunities of nonparties does not mean that the nonparties
have been deprived of legal rights or that they have standing to ap-
peal from that decree without becoming parties."'28 6 As developed
above, the argument that adversely affected incumbents are not de-
prived of vested employment rights must fail. What remains, how-
ever, is the need for a differentiation between types of rights or,
more precisely, between those claims that have secured the legal sta-
tus of property and those that lie in the more nebulous area of hope
and desire. The legal protections of employment reflect both set-
tled expectations of job tenure and the reliance of employees who
282 See Fiss, supra note 235, at 1078-82; CharlesJ. Cooper, The Collateral Attack Doc-
trine and the Rules of Intervention: A Judicial Pincer Movement on Due Process, 1987 U. Cm.
LEGAL F. 155, 155-57; Easterbrook, supra note 236, at 30-41; Laycock, supra note 55, at
104; Michael W. McConnell, Why Hold Elections? Using Consent Decrees to Insulate Policies
from Political Change, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295, 303-04; Resnick, supra note 239, at 70-
71; Kramer, supra note 190, at 364 (arguing that transfer and consolidation can avoid
problems associated with collateral attack rule while leaving freedom for original parties
to conclusively settle original litigation through bipolar consent decree).
283 See In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 740 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), aff'd, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986) ("In deciding whether to approve this settlement
proposal, the court starts from the familiar axiom that a bad settlement is almost always
better than a good trial.").
284 See Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., dis-
senting) (once the erstwhile adversaries approach court jointly, "all the dynamics con-
duce to judicial approval of [settlement]"), cert. dismissed, 394 U.S. 28 (1965).
285 See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 55, at 128-29 (advocating that courts refuse to enter
consent decrees where "arguable rights" of known or foreseeable third parties might be
affected).
286 Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 771 (1989) (Stevens,J., dissenting). See also Local
No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 511 (1989) (consent
decree altering pre-existing seniority-based standards for promotion "imposed no legal
duties or obligations" on white incumbents or on union representative).
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have devoted their working lives to the potential for advancement
through their employment. 287 In the words of Professor Atiyah,
"[t]o deprive somebody of something which he merely expects to
receive is a less serious wrong, deserving less protection, than to
deprive somebody of the expectation of continuing to hold some-
thing which he already possesses. ' 28 8 When the desired employ-
ment opportunity is even less than an "expect[ation] to receive," it
follows that the amount of legal protection owing is still more atten-
uated. As expressed by Oliver Wendell Holmes,
It is in the nature of man's mind. A thing which you have enjoyed
and used as your own for a long time, whether property or an
opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be torn away without
your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however you
came by it. The law can ask no better justification than the deep-
est instincts of man.
2 89
The legal rule of protecting entitlements over aspirations con-
forms to the real-world pattern of individuals, valuing their holdings
as worth more than their anticipated rewards, even if their monetary
value is equivalent. 290 While the conventional economic literature
assumes the equivalence of gains and losses from the transfer of a
good or entitlement, 29' a more compelling economic model recog-
nizes that the loss of present holdings or endowments 292 is valued
more than the prospect of acquiring a gain of the same magni-
tude.293 The labor economics literature refers to this phenomenon
as "hysteresis," a term from physics that has been generalized to
287 See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 64-68 (1990) (describing reliance interest of employees in continued
employment and job advancement); Issacharoff, supra note 157, at 621-24 (same).
288 P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 428 (1979). Profes-
sor Atiyah derives this principle not simply from case law but from the writings of
Hume, Adam Smith, and Bentham. Id at 428 & n.24.
289 Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897).
290 See David Cohen & Jack L. Knetsch, Judicial Choice and Disparities Between
Measures of Economic Values 14-15 (1990) (unpublished manuscript) (reviewing treat-
ment of endowed holdings in British and Canadian law).
291 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 11 (3d ed. 1986).
292 The term "endowment effect" refers to the disparities between the values as-
signed to marketable commodities by parties based upon the prior entitlement or refer-
ence point of the parties. See Richard H. Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer
Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 39 (1980) (coining term "endowment effect"). This
approach describes the persistent pattern of owners of goods demanding more for the
sale of the good than they would offer to acquire the good in the first place. See Robert,
C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actor: A Critique of Classical Law
and Economics, 65 CH.-KENT L. REv. 23, 35-43 (1989) (applying psychological insights to
legal problems); Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Test of the Endowment Effect and the
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990) (describing experimental research on en-
dowment effects).
293 See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tvesrky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Deci-
sion Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRiCA 263, 279 (1979). The legal implications of this issue
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refer to "any dependence of the value of a property on the past his-
tory of the system to which it pertains. ' 29 4 The concept of attach-
ment to present holdings in employment has been applied to
explain wage "stickiness" 295-the failure of wages to decline sub-
stantially in economic downturns-and the impact of unemploy-
ment on human capital accumulation.29 6
A mechanism for resolving the problem of externalities in the
settlement of public issue litigation is therefore suggested by an ex-
amination of whose rights are settled. When limiting or restricting
entitlements of nonlitigants who merit independent substantive pro-
tections, a court should reject any settlement that purports to settle
such third-party rights without the participation of all affected par-
ties. When, however, the rights affected are those falling within the
realm of hopes or aspirations, courts have far more latitude.
The case law is replete with challenges to affirmative action de-
crees that alter pre-existing expectations of the dispreferred, such as
Wendy Wygant and the numerous parties challenging consent de-
crees in the aftermath of Martin.297 But the case law has seen very
few plaintiffs like Allan Bakke298 or Marco DeFunis, 299 individuals so
incensed by the denial of an unsecured aspiration that they under-
took the rigors of litigation to challenge a modicum of remedial pol-
icy aimed at historically disadvantaged groups. So long as the
are more fully developed in Herbert Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the Endowment Effect, 20
J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1991).
294 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 585 (2d ed. 1989).
295 See OLIVER J. BLANCHARD & LAWRENCE H. SUMMERS, HYSTERESIS AND THE EURO-
PEAN UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM 13-18 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper No. 1950, 1986); Kahneman et al., supra note 292, at 1345.
296 See S.P. Hargreaves Heap, Choosing the Wrong Natural Rate, Accelerating Inflation or
Decelerating Unemployment and Growth, 90 ECON. J. 611 (1980).
297 This pattern is by no means limited to white incumbents. A recent major study
has shown that the vast majority of contemporary employment discrimination suits con-
cern allegations of wrongful termination of employment rather than wrongful refusal to
hire. See John J. Donoghue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015, 1027 (1991) (estimating that a mi-
nority worker who is discharged is 30 times more likely to initiate an employment dis-
crimination lawsuit than one rejected at the hiring stage). This study is fully consistent
with the view that working people attach a premium value to their current employment.
Consequently, workers subject to loss of a job actually held will readily resort to the
travails of litigation, in contrast to the job aspirants who will rarely sue. This turns out
to be the case regardless of the status of the employee as a member of a protected class
under the various antidiscrimination statutes and, as best one can generalize from the
existing information, regardless of the actual charge of discriminatory conduct: The
same quantum of discriminatory animus is far more likely to provoke a legal challenge in
the discharge as opposed to the hiring setting.
298 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (striking down
University of California at Davis medical school admissions policy under challenge from
dispreferred white applicant).
299 Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (challenging use of racial preferences
in University of Washington Law School admissions).
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preferences were not too naked and did not command a dispropor-
tionate share of available resources,300 the pre-1988 case law treated
affirmative action with relative tolerance.
Martin did not change that.
VI
PLACING THE BURDEN OF PRECLUSION ON THE LITIGANTS
Finally, the procedural issues remain. The altered views of the
civil rights consent decree from Cleveland Firefighters to Martin have
their procedural counterparts in the uses of intervention under Rule
24 or mandatory joinder under Rule 19. If applied, the practical
consequences of the two Rules appear identical. A party joined
under Rule 19 or intervening under Rule 24 would appear in the
case in the same posture. The difference, however, lies in the party
who will bear the burden of inclusion. Fundamentally, the issue is
whether potentially affected parties should be required to inform
themselves of possible consequences and initiate procedures to in-
tervene. Under Rule 24 intervention, the burden remains with po-
tentially affected parties to claim their rights or be foreclosed from
asserting them in the future.30" Rule 19, however, places the bur-
den upon parties to the litigation to affirmatively seek out any third
parties3 0 2 they wish to bind by the decree.
03
Once the issue is focused on vested incumbents, the arguments
in favor of forcing the parties to the litigation to bear the burden of
preclusion seem inescapable. The original litigants, particularly the
defendant employer, have full knowledge of the affected group and
have ready means to join them, either individually, as a class, or
jointly through a collective bargaining representative. The realm of
affected incumbents is not open-ended, as would be the case if all
future aspirants were granted the same rights as incumbents.
At bottom, the tension between the procedural approaches of
Cleveland Firefighters and Martin turns on the need to establish a pru-
dential rule consistent with the substantive rights involved. As set
forth in Martin
Joinder as a party, rather than knowledge of a lawsuit and an op-
portunity to intervene, is the method by which potential parties
are subjected to the jurisdiction of the court and bound by ajudg-
ment or decree. The parties to a lawsuit presumably know better
than anyone else the nature and scope of relief sought in the ac-
300 See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
301 See 7C WRcGrT ET AL., supra note 221, § 1923, at 518.
302 See id. §§ 1609, 1611.
303 But see Strickler, supra note 190, at 1574 (arguing thatjoinder under neither Rule
19 nor Rule 24 should have preclusive effect).
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tion, and at whose expense such relief might be granted. It makes
sense, therefore, to place on them a burden of bringing in addi-
tional parties where such a step is indicated, rather than placing
on potential additional parties a duty to intervene when they ac-
quire knowledge of the lawsuit.
3 0 4




The debate over affirmative action is caustic and draining. Of
necessity, issues are framed in the mold of group entitlements,
which is the precise framework of discussion that readily coexisted
with centuries of disadvantaged status for blacks and, to a lesser ex-
tent, other racial and ethnic minorities. But at bottom the debate is
one of politics, one of the extent to which a political resolution of
the second-class status of minorities can and will be found. It is this
fundamental political quality that gives rise to the "bitterness
and desperation" with which the "affirmative action struggle" is
waged.
3 0 5
Beyond the procedural and legal issues in this Article is also a
question of politics. The elections of 1990 witnessed the crystalliza-
tion of a disturbing trend in the body politic. The denial of employ-
ment opportunities to whites emerged as a rallying theme in the rise
of David Duke as a Republican leader in Louisiana and the re-
election of Jesse Helms as a senator from North Carolina.3 0 6 The
issues surrounding employment grew to have the same riveting im-
pact as evidenced in George Wallace's invocation of the school bus's
symbolic role in desegregation remedies during his presidential race
of 1972.307 Many will no doubt argue that Duke and Helms play
merely to racist backlash, with the issues of employment serving as a
304 Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 765 (1989); see also Chase Nat'l Bank v. Norwalk,
291 U.S. 431 (1934).
The law does not impose upon any person absolutely entitled, to a hear-
ing the burden of voluntary intervention in a suit to which he is a stranger
.... Unless duly summoned to appear in a legal proceeding, a person
not a privy may rest assured that a judgment recovered therein will not
affect his legal rights.
Id. at 441.
305 Kennedy, supra note 125, at 1338.
306 Peter Applebome, Racial Politics in South's Contests: Hot Wind of Hate or a Last
Gasp?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1990, at Al.
307 See generally THEODORE H. WHrrE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1972, at 94
(1973) (busing, Wallace said during the campaign, was "the most atrocious, callous,
cruel, asinine thing you can do for little children .... [T]hese pluperfect hypocrites who
live over in Maryland or Virginia and they've got their children in a private school ....
[T]omorrow [on primary day] the chickens are coming home to roost").
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smokescreen for resurgent racial animus.3 08 But people rally most
convincingly around such appeals when the stakes involved are their
possessions rather than abstract desires.30 9
The analysis in this Article accomplishes two things. First, it
demonstrates that the invocation of legal protections for entrenched
employment rights is not only to be expected, but should be
respected as consistent with the expansion of legal protections of
individual claims to security. Second, it shows that attention to the
disruption of settled individual expectations places political resolu-
tions of historic discrimination back in the hands of the institutional
actors that are morally and legally the culprits in promoting and
practicing racial inequality.
Forcing institutional actors to absorb the costs of remedying
their own discriminatory practices will eliminate neither racial ani-
mus nor opposition to affirmative action. It may, however, undercut
some of the urgency and fear of individual employees faced with the
uncertainty of losing the benefits of years or even decades of steady
employment.310 That in itself may facilitate the process of pushing
on with the quest for equality.
308 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 125, at 1337-41 (arguing that racism is a critical
element of opposition to affirmative action).
309 See Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerging
First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 35-39 (1990) (arguing in First Amend-
"ment context that personal stake is the wellspring of expressed political views).
5 10 See WILSON, supra note 224, at 123 (employer resistance to minority preferences
during "slack labor" markets "exacerbated by increased hostility to affirmative action by
dominant-group workers who fear the loss of their own jobs to minority competition").
1992] 253
